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ABSTRACT 
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LIFE IN YUSUF ATILGAN’S AYLAK ADAM AND JULIO CORTAZAR’S 
RAYUELA 
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This thesis focuses on the theme of absurdity within the quotidian boundaries of life in 
Yusuf Atılgan’s Aylak Adam and Julio Cortázar’s Rayuela (translated as Hopscotch into 
English and Sek Sek into Turkish). Despite the linguistic, political, and social differences 
in the novels’ backgrounds, striking similarities appear between the two protagonists—
Aylak Adam’s C and Rayuela’s Horacio Oliveira. Both of these twentieth century literary 
characters are deeply affected by Existentialism in their conceptions of the world, or more 
specifically, of what is called everyday life. The shared notion of both is that accepting 
societal norms and abiding by the status quo is what makes each individual’s life similar 
to the others’; in other words, to live like everybody else is to forgo one’s individuality. 
For this reason, social institutions or acts such as marriage, having children, and/or 
working at a job turn life into a vicious, repetitive cycle, consequently rendering it absurd. 
I pay particular attention to C’s idleness as an act of resistance to this uniformity, and 
how Cortázar’s Oliveira, in a similar way, prioritizes his intellectual pursuits over social 
expectations. By making a comparative analysis of both works and eventually exploring 
how the existentialist flâneur perceives everyday life as absurd while he struggles to 
escape from habit, I aim to show how a Turkish and an Argentinian novel with completely 
different backgrounds can intersect through a universal anguish: existential dread. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
VAR OLMANIN DAYANILMAZ AĞIRLIĞI: YUSUF ATILGAN’IN AYLAK 
ADAM VE JULIO CORTAZAR’IN RAYUELA ROMANLARINDA GÜNDELİK 
HAYATIN ABSÜRTLÜĞÜ 
 
 
 
ZEYNEP ÖZGÜL 
 
KÜLTÜREL ÇALIŞMALAR YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Sibel Irzık 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: karşılaştırmalı edebiyat, varoluşçuluk, absürtlük, gündelik hayat 
 
 
Bu tez Yusuf Atılgan’ın Aylak Adam ve Julio Cortázar’ın Rayuela (İngilizce’ye 
Hopscotch, Türkçe’ye Sek Sek olarak çevrilen) isimli romanlarında gündelik hayat 
sınırları içeresinde absürtlük teması üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. İki romanın zeminindeki 
dilsel, siyasi ve sosyal farklılıklara rağmen Aylak Adam’ın C’si ve Rayuela’nın Horacio 
Oliveira isimli ana karakteri arasında kayda değer benzerlikler gözlemlenmektedir. Bu 
yirminci yüzyıl edebi karakterlerinin ikisinin de dünyayı, özellikle gündelik hayat olarak 
adlandırılan alanı, algılama biçimleri Varoluşçuluk felsefesi tarafından derinden 
etkilenmiştir. İki karakterin ortak düşüncesine göre toplumsal normlara uygun olarak ve 
mevcut düzeni sorgulamadan kabul ederek yaşamak her bir bireyin yaşamını 
aynılaştırmaktır; diğer bir deyişle, herkes gibi yaşamak bireyin özgünlüğünden feragat 
etmesi demektir. Bu sebeple, evlilik, çocuk ve/veya iş sahibi olma gibi toplumsal kuruluş 
ve davranışlar hayatı kendini tekrarlayan bir kısır döngü haline getirerek 
absürtleştirmektedir. Bu tekdüzeliğe karşı bir eylem olarak C’nin aylaklığı ve benzer 
şekilde Oliveira’nın entelektüel uğraşlarına toplumun beklentilerinden daha fazla önem 
vermesi üzerine özellikle yoğunlaşıyorum. İki eserin karşılaştırmalı analizini yaparak ve 
sonuç olarak varoluşçu flanörün alışkanlıktan kaçmaya çabalarken gündelik hayatı nasıl 
absürt olarak algıladığını açımlayarak, Türkiye’den ve Arjantin’den tamamen farklı alt 
yapılara sahip iki romanın nasıl evrensel bir ıstırap olan varoluşsal kriz üzerinden 
kesiştiğini göstermeyi hedefliyorum.  
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1. INTRODUCTION: EXISTENTIALISM IN THE PERIPHERY 
 
 
 
“Pretender que uno es el centro […] es incalculablemente 
idiota. Un centro tan ilusorio como la seria pretender la 
ubicuidad. No hay centro, hay una especie de confluencia 
continua, de ondulación de la materia.”1 
 
“Doğru, hep başkayız. Ayak bastığımız yer dünyanın merkezi 
oluyor. Her şey bizim çevremizde dönüyor…”2 3 
 
The words above, the first uttered by Cortázar’s existential (anti-)hero Horacio Oliveira 
in Rayuela, and the second by Atılgan’s “idle” C, sum up the purpose of this chapter to 
perfection. Being mid-20th century novels, both in Cortázar’s and Atılgan’s works the 
imprint and influence of Existentialism is easy to recognize. A significant point is that 
Existentialism was, and is, considered to be a “European” movement, having sprung from 
the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard, who was originally from Denmark, and reached its 
peak during the 20th century France. Although Cortázar was born in Brussels, he grew up 
in Buenos Aires, and Atılgan is known to have lived only in Turkey, thus situating both 
writers in what would be considered “outside” the center of Existentialism, into the 
periphery. Through the comparison of both texts, I also aim to focus on how 
existentialism was understood and put into practice in what is called the outside of the 
“center.” As both philosophy and literature, particularly in the 20th century when 
Existentialism was at its peak and when these two novels were written, were more 
                                                     
1 “To get the idea that you are the center […] is incalculably stupid. A center as illusory as it would be to try to find 
ubiquity. There is no center, there’s a kind of continuous confluence, an undulation of matter.” (trans. Gregory Rabassa) 
 
2 “True, we are always different. Wherever we step on, it’s the center of the world. Everything revolves around us.” 
(my translation) 
 
3  All the translations from Aylak Adam in this thesis belong to me unless otherwise stated. 
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Eurocentric, especially compared to the present-day—although it is still a debatable topic 
nowadays, as well.  The quotations above, respectively from Rayuela and Aylak Adam, 
adequately reflect that this insistence of the presence of a “center” is overrated, and is, in 
a way, a social construction, created by the dominant who believes “wherever [they] step 
on” is “the center of the world.” Of course, the main reason of the Eurocentrism of 
Existentialism is the recognition of 20th century French philosophers, such as Sartre, 
Camus, and Beauvoir, as the pinnacle of Existentialist (and Absurd) philosophy. Still, 
even though the word “existentialism” could be a European invention, the state of being 
that it refers to is universal, and as existential angst is felt and present in all beings, I 
believe it is significant to look into the periphery—in this case Turkey and Latin 
America—to acknowledge the effects of culture, language, and other social constructions 
on the understanding of Existentialism, and how it differs from the Eurocentric canon. In 
fact, Cortázar’s claim that there is a confluence, or confluencia, rather than one rigid 
center seems plausible; while the theory might emerge in one place, through its flow it 
travels and finds form outside of the “center” as well. In fact, Edward Said’s theory on 
the journey of theories is fitting. In “Traveling Theory” he asserts that “[l]ike people and 
schools of criticism, ideas and theories travel—from person to person, from situation to 
situation, from one period to another, […] the movement of ideas and theories from one 
place to another is both a fact of life and a usefully enabling condition of intellectual 
activity.” (Said 1983, 226). Through Said’s claim, this confluence of idea takes a clearer 
shape; in both Atılgan’s and Cortázar’s works what we see is a reflection of the traveling 
of one or multiple theories, the main one being Existentialism. By means of this travel, 
the idea of the center is deconstructed, opening the way for the neglected itinerary of this 
journey, the periphery, rather than its starting point. Hence, one of the aims of this thesis 
is to glimpse through the effects of Existentialism “outside” the considered center and 
how it affected and shaped the lives, and therefore works, of both Cortázar and Atılgan, 
examining it through Rayuela and Aylak Adam by discussing the level of similarity 
between the characters of Oliveira and C and their creators at the same time. 
 
It can be seen that even the way both novels start seems similar through their opening 
sentences: “All of a sudden, I realized that she could be among this crowd, on this 
pavement overflowing with people. My inner distress melted away.” (Atılgan 2015, 9).4 
                                                     
4 “Birden kaldırımlardan taşan kalabalıkta onun da olabileceği aklıma geldi. İçimdeki sıkıntı eridi.” 
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“Would I find La Maga?” (Cortázar 2013, 3). A pivotal point might be the choice of 
words here. In the original Spanish version of the text, the word Cortázar uses for “find” 
is encontrar. This I believe is significant as it can both mean “to find” and “to encounter” 
or “come across,” adding it a pinch of coincidence, as well. When we look into both 
novels, it can be seen that coincidence is a crucial part of both, as their search is also 
based on it. In Aylak Adam, C keeps looking for a woman he has never met, meeting 
others along the way, thinking they could be she, relying on not much more than 
coincidence. In Rayuela, Oliveira is in a similar search for his former mistress, La Maga, 
who, unlike C’s woman, is known and appears in most of the chapters in the novel until 
her disappearance. Again, Cortázar’s novel uses coincidence as a base; life is in a flux as 
it is not planned, and thus not certain. Precariousness, therefore, exists in both characters’ 
lives, as a result of their rejection of habit. The main focus of my thesis is based on this 
rejection; I focus on the novels and the protagonists from three perspectives—as the 
existentialist, the flaneur/idler, and the refuser of habit, yet in fact all three are intertwined 
with each other, and are included in a continuous flow through a cause and effect 
relationship. The way I see it, it is the existential angst that fuels the need for wandering, 
or flanerie, and through the precariousness it creates emerges even a stronger 
dissatisfaction with uniformity and habit, assigning it the sense of absurdity. Thus, I 
separated each chapter into three parts for each novel and followed this pattern so as to 
create a linearity—which, ironically, is something neither C nor Oliveira seems to be in 
favor of in real life.  
 
The second chapter of this thesis takes Yusuf Atılgan and Aylak Adam as its focus. The 
first part takes as its focus how existentialism was introduced and later understood in 
Turkey, and the way Atılgan became involved with it, inspiring the novel eventually. It 
continues with C the protagonist’s own existential crisis, and how it makes an idler out 
of him, fitting the title of the book.5 It draws similarities between the internal feud of 
Atılgan’s characters and Sartre’s novels, such as Nausea, as Sartre was a major inspiration 
for Atılgan—just like he was for Cortázar, as well. I mention Sartre’s term “bad faith” to 
refer to the connection most characters have in the novel with comfort, accelerated by 
habit itself, and how this separates C from others in terms of freedom and self-awareness, 
building his loneliness at the same time. In the second part, I focus on the question of the 
                                                     
5 Aylak Adam literally means “The Idler”, or “The Idle Man”. (Aylak: idle, Adam: man) 
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flaneur and the man of the crowd, first introduced by Walter Benjamin, and which one 
C’s character seems to be closer to. As flanerie is associated with wandering, but also 
with search itself, I consider it as focal point to discuss C’s search throughout the novel, 
and whether the search is for a woman as he claims to be, or if the woman is just a 
metaphor, after all. Moreover, I analyzed flanerie as a part of his idleness and a way for 
him to escape routine, as his seeking seems to be based on coincidence. The third part 
connects these themes to habit and how it is interpreted as absurd by the main character. 
There I utilize Camus’ ideas on absurdity and Absurdism, mainly through his essay, The 
Myth of Sisyphus, to draw an analogy between Sisyphus’ situation and that of the modern 
individual. Through this absurdity, C’s suicide attempt, and oncoming madness, I propose 
the question of madness as an escape from habit, as opposed to suicide, which Camus 
proposes as a response to absurdity. Yet, as the reader never sees the complete realization 
of madness in the novel, the question remains open-ended. 
 
The third chapter focuses on Julio Cortázar and Rayuela. Similar to the process in the 
second chapter, I aimed to create a pattern of existentialism–flanerie–absurdity, 
connecting all in the last part. In the first part, I introduce Cortázar as the “Latin American 
Intellectual” and delve into the periphery of the literary canon as even though he was born 
and lived in Europe for most of his life (which is not the case in the life of Atılgan, as he 
lived only in Turkey, for most of his life in a small village in Manisa), his Argentineness 
plays a pivotal role in the novel. Yet, Cortázar is not the only Latin American intellectual 
on display; Horacio Oliveira, the protagonist of Rayuela, is the other one. His intellectual 
self and his involvement with the Serpent Club, an intellectual group he founded with his 
bohemian friends in Paris where they talk about philosophy, music, art etc., creates the 
contrast between his Latin American intellectual self and his identity as an expat in Paris, 
very similar to the case of Cortázar, apart from the fact that he was in Paris as a part of 
his self-imposed exile and not as an expat. Through this intellectuality, one can also 
observe how the existentialist angst interlaces with his search—similar to C’s, yet the fact 
that Oliveira is in Paris, the practical heart of Existential philosophy and that he is there 
in the 20th century, the time where the movement reached its peak, of course amplifies 
both the crisis and the search. The second part, therefore, focuses on flânerie and search, 
following the cities of Oliveira (and Cortázar): first Paris, then Buenos Aires upon his 
eventual homecoming. Flânerie as an act of resistance is embedded in this chapter, as 
well, to question the motives of search itself, and whether it could save one from the 
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excruciating pain caused by the monotony of habit and the absurdity of life. The last part 
connects the first two to the absurdity of daily life. It observes how absurdity is 
constructed and deconstructed through the novel and follows the similar pattern of suicide 
and madness in Aylak Adam. This I believe is significant as both novels are from the 
outside of what is considered the international literary canon, and it is a very low 
possibility that the two authors ever heard of each other before or after the time they 
penned their novels. This, therefore, brings out the claim that Existentialism, as a 
universal movement (and angst), led to similar conclusions in Turkey, Latin America, 
and other parts of the world.  
 
In conclusion, I propose this thesis as a humble contribution to the study of comparative 
literature, especially to the study of the “periphery” and the comparison of Turkey and 
Latin America, which I think is overlooked in the area of comparative literature despite 
the many similarities the two regions share. Through this thesis, I aimed to show that two 
countries that are far away from each other and tend to be less in demand in terms of 
literary study compared to Europe and the United States, exhibit a connection through a 
universal subject such as Existentialism. Even though both Atılgan and Cortázar were 
unquestionably and naturally inspired by French Existentialists, they lived almost 
completely different lives and reflected these lives in their works; yet they still remained 
significantly akin to each other.  
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2. YUSUF ATILGAN AND AYLAK ADAM: THE (C)ONTRARY MAN OF 
TURKISH LITERATURE 
 
 
 
2.1. The Turkish Existentialist: Atılgan and his Anti-Hero 
 
 
Perhaps the first thing the reader should be acquainted with is that Atılgan’s roots, unlike 
those of Cortázar, who was born in Brussels and raised in Buenos Aires, do not come 
from the city. He was born in Manisa, a city in the Aegaeon region of Turkey, in 1921, a 
year before her parents relocated—due to the burning down of the city, or in his words 
“after the Greeks burned down the city,” (Yüksel 1992, 11) during the First World War—
to a village in the same city called Hacırahman, where he ended up living for more than 
half of his life. Atılgan’s having lived mostly in the rural is significant within the scope 
of Aylak Adam, a city novel. This of course does not mean that he is not familiar with city 
life, as he did reside in Istanbul for many years, coming for the first time to study literature 
at Istanbul University in 1939. Thus, while not excluding his years in the metropolis, 
Atılgan’s attachment for and adherence to his hometown do affect his novels, including 
Aylak Adam.  
 
When Yusuf Atılgan published Aylak Adam, his first novel, in 1959, Europe was 
convulsing with the sensational Existentialist philosophy, which, at that time, seemed to 
be dominated by French writers, names such as Jean Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
and Simone de Beauvoir strikingly standing out. With the publication of Sartre’s Being 
and Nothingness in 1943, the idea that “existence precedes essence” was becoming more 
and more widely known. In Turkey, however, Existentialism, or varoluşçuluk, began to 
gain more focus and attention after Nusret Hızır, a Turkish philosopher, published a 
couple of articles on existentialism in Yücel, a literary magazine, in 1956 (Direk 2001, 
442). Jean Paul Sartre’s work was first translated into Turkish in the late 1940s (Koş 
 7 
 
2010, 54), effectually inducing the spread of existentialist thought within Turkish 
intellectuals. In fact, Hızır’s writings mostly focused on Sartre’s works, mainly Being and 
Nothingness, whose ideology Hızır interpreted as “being stuck in an anti-intellectual 
paradox” (Direk 2001, 443). The same year Peyami Safa, an acclaimed Turkish author to 
this day, also published his writings on the newly-introduced existentialist thought in a 
magazine called Türk Düşüncesi (Turkish Thought). Safa’s approach, unlike Hızır’s, was 
more critical. While Safa was in favor of Religious, or Christian, Existentialism rooted in 
Kierkegaard’s ideology, he denounced Sartre’s philosophy because it was based on 
godless existentialism, claiming that atheistic existentialism is an absurd philosophy as 
much as it is “the philosophy of the absurd” (Ibid, 445). The reason for this, according to 
Ayşenaz Koş, was that the ideas of Western existentialists were mostly apprehended as 
absurd in Turkey as a result of the disparity between Western and Turkish thought (Koş 
2010, 44), Turkey still being a predominantly Islamic country at the time. However, at 
the time the main discussion of existentialist theory was not actually on the theory itself, 
but on its popular image (Direk 2001, 448), thus perhaps in Safa’s criticism there lies an 
undisclosed panic about the spread of atheism through the popularized image of 
existentialist philosophy.  
 
In terms of politics, 1950 was the beginning of a new party era; the right-wing Democratic 
Party came into power after the single party regime of the Republican People’s Party of 
twenty-seven years (Lewis 1968, 315). This is significant in terms of the effects it had on 
the society; according to Walter Weiker, the multiparty period created a “religious 
revival” by appealing “openly to religious sentiments” (Weiker 1981, 105). Thus, with 
the weakening of secularism that rose during the single party era of the left-wing 
Republican People’s Party, it does not come as a surprise that conservative approaches to 
Existentialism, such as Safa’s, emerged.  
 
From this perspective, there seems little doubt that Atılgan was affected by the 
overwhelming popularity of Existentialism at the time. He was a translator of 
Kierkegaard’s work and his translation of The Sickness unto Death was among some of 
the pieces in Yusuf Atılgan’a Armağan (A Gift to Yusuf Atılgan), a book written and 
compiled by Atılgan’s friends following his death.  
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Having leftist tendencies himself, Atılgan was among the ones jailed with the accusation 
of being an advocate of communism when he was still a literature student at university in 
1945, fourteen years prior to the publication of Aylak Adam. His friend Turan Yüksel 
states in Yusuf Atılgan’a Armağan that he did not see post-incarceration Atılgan again 
after his ten-month sentence in jail as Atılgan went back to his hometown, Hacırahman, 
and Yüksel learned about his friend’s activities only after the publication of Aylak Adam 
(Yüksel 1992, 24). 
 
Considering the background of Aylak Adam, the fact that it revolves around a character 
struggling with existential angst is no surprise. Indeed, just like Anayurt Oteli6—Atılgan’s 
second novel—Aylak Adam was also interpreted by scholars as an existential novel, 
following a 28-year-old moneyed “idler” called C through his search, as he calls it, for 
true love. The novel is divided into four chapters, one for each season: Winter, Spring, 
Summer, and Fall, making the novel a reflection of a year in the life of C, the protagonist. 
 
What C claims to be doing throughout the novel is looking for a woman, the love of his 
life, by walking through the neighborhoods of Istanbul, becoming involved in 
relationships with different women, and trying to escape the haunting of his past. C is no 
ordinary character; he refuses to live by the status quo as he has no job and has no 
intention of acquiring one in the future, and calls himself an aylak: “The woman asked, 
‘Don’t you have any other business to attend to?’ ‘No, I am an idler’” (Atılgan 2015, 95).7 
 
‘Aylak’ is one of those words whose full meaning becomes lost in translation. One could 
translate it as “idler” or “slacker,” or a combination of both. It does, however, carry the 
connotation of solitude, or loneliness, as well, thus rendering futile the effort to reduce it 
into a single word in English. The Turkish Language Association (TDK) defines aylak as 
“(someone) who is unemployed, a slacker or a wanderer who roams aimlessly.”8 In the 
case of C, he is unemployed, yet it would not do him justice to call him a “slacker.” As 
mentioned before, C does have an aim regarding his wanderings. What he claims to be 
                                                     
6 Translated into English as Motherland Hotel by Fred Stark, City Light Books, 2016. 
 
7 “Kadın, ‘Sizin başka işiniz yok mu?’ diye sordu.” 
  ‘Hayır, Aylakım ben.’” 
 
8 http://sozluk.gov.tr 
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looking for is a woman that he has not even met, who he believes will be able to give him 
true love. In fact, this is how the novel starts: “All of a sudden, I realized that she could 
be among this crowd, on this pavement overflowing with people. My inner distress melted 
away” (Atılgan 2015, 9).9 However, I aim to debate in this thesis whether this or idleness 
is the actual aim of his search. 
 
The first chapter, titled “Winter,” follows the course of C’s wanderings through the city. 
It begins with speculations about encountering the woman he is looking for, a woman 
whom he has never met, in the streets he keeps walking on. He reminisces about a fight 
he was involved in where he was beaten up by tailors, kisses a Greek (Rum) girl on the 
street, then goes to visit his painter friends (or perhaps acquaintances would be a more 
suitable term). He, then, eats at a restaurant and goes to the cinema to watch a movie, 
followed by a drink at a beerhouse. Another day, he goes to the studio of a former 
girlfriend of his, Ayşe, who is a painter, where the neighbors call the police upon his 
arrival and he is forced to leave despite having a key to the studio. The chapter ends with 
his encounter with a beggar who is smoking and hides the cigarette upon seeing C. Just 
to mess with him, C asks him for a cigarette, and when the beggar says he does not smoke, 
C fakes a pitiful voice saying he would pay two and a half kuruş (much more than it is 
worth) for a single cigarette and walks away. He decides to follow the beggar for a couple 
off streets, then changes his direction to the main street.  
 
This can provide the reader with a spectrum of the quotidian doings of C, and glimpse 
into the reasons for his refusal of the status quo. Unlike a regular, standard individual of 
the society, C does not have a job. It becomes clear in the novel that he has inherited a 
couple of buildings and lives by the rents he collects from them, making it possible for 
him to eat and drink out every day without financial difficulties. Right after he meets his 
painter friends, they count out their speculations on what could have happened to C as 
they had not seen him for a while, and mention that they decided on the unlikely 
possibility that he found a job. C’s response to this is positive; he remarks that he indeed 
found a job and goes on to explain:  
 
“Ever since I read that street sign named “The Street of the Two Orphans,” I 
devoted myself to a business. I was going to collect street names and reflect 
                                                     
9 “Birden kaldırımlardan taşan kalabalıkta onun da olabileceği aklıma geldi. İçimdeki sıkıntı eridi.”  
 10 
 
on them. I worked on this business for three days; and quitted it in the 
afternoon yesterday. Each street I entered had that stoop shouldered man 
behind. Now, I am an idler once more. [...] I have been seeing different streets 
for three days, as well. There is one called “The Lion’s Den,” with a lot of 
curves. I wonder if once upon a time a lion settled in one of the corners and 
suddenly all the city came here to watch it, or whether what they called a lion 
was just a pompous vagabond. What about that street called “The Street of 
Rowed Cypresses” where you cannot encounter one cypress three: Asphalt, 
concrete buildings one after another, a flock of automobiles, a flock of 
fastwalking people… Did people walked like this when there used to be 
actual cypresses in this street, too?” (Ibid, 14)10 
 
What C describes as a job is not what would usually fit into the category of a “normal” 
job. First of all, he receives no salary in return for his service, making it more of a 
“hobby” than an occupation according to many. Moreover, it is doubtful that his 
claimed job would even be considered as service when compared to occupations that 
are considered more productive and rewarding. Even painting, considered as a useless 
and unworthy occupation by many, strikes one as more acceptable. It can be seen how 
C indulges in the details of the quotidian that most tend to disregard or overlook, such 
as the connection he aims to find between the names of streets and the meanings behind 
them. As a result, he is not taken seriously by the painters, his attempted job being 
considered unsuitable and senseless, and he himself does not maintain it, going back 
to idleness. As he also refuses to stick by the mainstream, he does not believe in the 
existence of an occupation that would suit his ideals: “I am an idler, he said, I have 
money. Moreover, there is no job that I could do.” (Atılgan 2015, 27).11 
 
C’s criticism of the mechanical workings of the society is repeated many times 
throughout the novel. Apart from avoiding occupational work, he is also cynical about 
people who go to work on a daily basis and turn it into an unavoidable part of human 
nature: 
 
                                                     
10 Dört gün önce bir sokak levhasında ‘İki Öksüzler Sokağı’ adını okuduğum zaman kendi kendimi bir işe adadım. 
Şehrin sokak adlarını toplayacak, bunlar üstüne düşünecektim. Üç gün çalıştım bu işte; dün öğlen bıraktım. Hangi 
sokağa gitsem ardında hep o bir omuzu düşük adam vardı. Şimdi yine aylakım. […] Üç gündür başka sokaklar da 
gördüm. Bir ‘Aslan Yatağı Sokağı’ var, bol dönemeçli. Bir zamanlar köşelerden birine bir gerçek aslan yerleşti de 
bütün şehir onu seyre mi koştu, yoksa aslan dedikleri övüngen mahalle kopuklarından biri miydi? Ya o sonuna dek 
gidip de bir tek servi göremeyeceğiniz ‘Sıra Serviler Caddesi’: Asfalt, üst üste beton yapılar, otomobiller sürüsü, 
hızlıyürüyeninsanlar sürüsü… Bu yolun servili olduğu zamanlar da insanlar böyle mi yürürdü?  
 
11 “Aylağım ben, demişti, param var. Hem benim yapabileceğim bir iş de yok.” 
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“Who knows, perhaps if there was no such thing as boredom, people would 
forget to go to work. ‘Work is a consolation’, his father used to say. He 
wanted no such consolation. What they called work was writing, teaching, 
hammering, all in a uniform way. Even a driver that blows his horn in a 
different way, or an ironsmith who swings his hammer with a unique air 
would be repeating themselves a day later. The purpose of life was habit, was 
comfort. The majority was afraid of making an effort, of novelty.  How easy 
it was to keep up with them! If he wanted, he could give lectures at a school 
during the day, and go to bed with silent, beautiful women at night. In an 
effortless way. But he knew: it would not be enough. There had to be 
something more.” (Ibid, 41, my italics)12 
 
For Atılgan’s C, a job is an obstacle standing in the way of individuality. As he claims, 
no matter how different a person would try to do their job every day, it is bound to 
repeat itself at some point, turning life into one repetitive vicious cycle, and replacing 
individuality with uniformity. While habit, according to him, is the nightmare that 
drains the life out of people, for the ones abiding by the status quo it is what makes life 
easier to manage, giving them comfort as they become sure of what is coming next as 
a result of this repetition. Unlike those who refuse to provide room for change so as 
not to disturb the course of life ruled by habit, C rejects uniformity and repetitiveness 
by choosing idleness over work, believing there is more to life, something that would 
invest it with meaning, than the absurdity of habit. 
 
The effect of Existentialism on Atılgan’s work can be observed here. C is considered 
to be an existentialist (anti-)hero for his refusal to abide by the norms that provide 
meaning to other people’s way of life. What he actually is doing by searching for 
“something more” is to search for meaning, the main conundrum of Existentialism 
itself. While challenging uniformity, C is intimidated by his own existential angst as 
well, questioning why he cannot be satisfied without looking beyond the quotidian 
boundaries as everybody around him does: “You all are comfortable. How easy it is 
for you to be relieved. Why can’t I be like you, too? Am I the only one thinking? Am 
I the only one by myself?” (Ibid, 39).13 This seems to bear many similarities to the 
                                                     
12 Kim bilir, belki iç sıkıntısı olmasa insanlar işe gitmeyi unuturlardı. ‘İş avutur,’ derdi babası. O böyle avuntu 
istemiyordu.  Bir örnek yazılar yazmak, bir örnek dersler vermek, bir örnek çekiç sallamaktı onların iş dedikleri. 
Kornasını ötekilerden başka öttüren bir şoför, çekicini başka bir ahenkle sallayan bir demirci bile ikinci gün kendini 
tekrarlıyordu. Yaşamanın amacı alışkanlıktı, rahatlıktı. Çoğunluk çabadan, yenilikten korkuyordu. Ne kolaydı onlara 
uymak! Gündüzleri bir okulda ders verir, geceleri sessiz, güzel kadınlarla yatardı istese. Çabasız. Ama biliyordu: 
Yetinemeyecekti. Başka şeyler gerekti. 
 
13 “Rahatsınız. Hem ne kolay rahatlıyorsunuz. İçinizde boşluklar yok. Neden ben de sizin gibi olamıyorum? Bir ben 
miyim düşünen? Bir ben miyim yalnız?” 
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famous novel of the existentialist writer Jean-Paul Sartre, whose works left a 
remarkable impact on both Atılgan and Cortázar: Nausea. Similar to Aylak Adam, 
Nausea was also Sartre’s first novel, revolving around a French writer named Antoine 
Roquetin, who is appalled by his existence. While it cannot be said with certainty that 
C detests existing, he is as intrigued by life as Roquetin. In fact, Roquetin’s entries in 
his diary in Nausea demonstrate perfectly how similar the two characters are: “I am 
alone in the midst of these happy, reasonable voices. All these characters spend their 
time explaining themselves, and happily recognizing that they hold the same opinions. 
Good God, how important they consider it to think the same things all together.” 
(Sartre 2000, 19). A point Sartre takes care to show through Roquetin is that being in 
need of “something more,” as in the words of Atılgan, creates a disparity between the 
individualist and the members of the society who revolve around habit and find 
comfort in it. While “hold[ing] the same opinions” seems to bring happiness to them, 
it creates the aforementioned uniformity at the same time, the very one that eradicates 
uniqueness, creating harmony through homogeneity. In a way, the uneasiness resulting 
from the discontent with the conventional way of life estranges the ones holding 
divergent opinions, like C and Roquetin.  
 
Sartre claims in his Existentialism Is a Humanism that freedom is inevitable for human 
beings, whether they like it or not. While this seems to bear a positive connotation at 
first glance, the fact that freedom comes with a price, that is responsibility, becomes 
overwhelming. According to existentialist thought, existence precedes essence. In 
other words, unlike objects, human beings are created without a specific purpose in 
life. It is up to us, humans, to search for meaning and create our own purpose. The 
discussion of freedom therefore is relevant, as in the absence of a predetermined 
essence or purpose humans become free to act as they like rather than having to be 
chained to presupposed roles. Nonetheless, every action has its opposite reaction, and 
with freedom comes the burden of responsibility: 
 
“If, however, existence truly does precede essence, man is responsible for 
what he is. Thus, the first effect of existentialism is to make every man 
conscious of what he is, and to make him solely responsible for his own 
existence. And when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not 
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mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is 
responsible for all men.” (Sartre 2007, 23) 
 
Thus, it can be noticed that existential angst, in a manner, serves to provide the 
individual with the consciousness of self. This can be observed in the case of C as he 
revolts against others for sticking by the ordinary, being well-aware that he thinks and 
feels and acts in a different way compared to them. In fact, he even claims he is the 
“only one thinking” after all, blaming the others for being oblivious to the real meaning 
of life. It is worth mentioning that even though he appears to desire to live like others 
at some point, asking angrily at himself why he cannot be like them, according to 
Sartre’s thought he is free to adopt the “easy” way of living without mindfulness and 
thinking. Why then, even when he is severely irritated by his crushing self-awareness 
and loneliness, does he not follow that path? This is perhaps a challenging question 
without a straightforward answer; however, his self-awareness clearly withholds him 
from living in a standard way. All the comfortable, happy voices are so for a reason; 
they are unaware of a way of living that is outside of what they have become used to. 
Habit breeds comfort and inhibits the desire to go beyond the familiar and the 
convenient. Being self-aware, it is almost impossible for someone like C to become a 
“regular,” undistinguished person and be content with it.  
 
By stating that through action man becomes responsible for everyone else, Sartre 
believes that by choosing to realize an act, the individual creates a template for others. 
This is the reason why the burden of responsibility transcends selfhood, adding to 
one’s existential crisis:  
 
“[…] if I decide to marry and have children – granted such a marriage 
proceeds solely from my own circumstances, my passion, or only desire- I 
am nonetheless committing not only myself, but all of humanity, to the 
practice of monogamy. I am therefore responsible for myself and for 
everyone else, and I am fashioning a certain image of man as I choose him to 
be. In choosing myself, I choose man.” (Ibid, 24-25) 
 
This can be applied to the case of C, not through his actions, but his inertia. Of course, 
idleness is not the same as inertia, and it is observed in the novel that he does not just 
lie around and expect his destiny to catch up with him, if he believes in one. He is on 
a constant search to encounter the true love he is looking for in the streets of Istanbul. 
 14 
 
This inertia, hence, is the refusal of societal norms such as marriage and employment. 
It might conceivably be claimed that by rejecting work and/or a stable relationship, C 
tries to escape being burdened by others’ responsibilities; still the lack of action is 
itself an action, making it impossible for him to elude responsibility for good.  
 
Despite his refusal to stick to the status quo, the women C establishes relationships 
with have tendencies to desire to live by the norms he seems to criticize. Güler, whom 
C meets for the first time in the second chapter titled “Spring,” is a university student, 
therefore his junior. The means by which C meets her is similar to how he meets every 
woman in his life: following. The underlying reason of his chasing and following 
random women on the street is the same reason as his search. This is the only way he 
expects to finally meet the woman who he believes will bring true love to his life, and 
therefore meaning. Whether he relies on pure coincidence on this issue is debatable, 
yet this possibility cannot be completely denied. Indeed, when he comes across Güler 
for the first time, she is with a friend of hers named B, whom C claims then and later 
to be the woman he was actually looking for. He hesitates a moment, not being sure 
about which one to follow, and chooses to go after Güler in the end:  
 
“Just now two girls were standing in the corner, talking. Her shoes didn’t have 
hells. Now, that was good… What if…? His heart started pounding. One’s 
raincoat was light brown, the other’s light blue. They were just about to 
separate. He shouted from within: ‘Come on, shake each other’s hands!’ The 
girls kissed each other. […] He could see both girls running to the corner. The 
light brown was walking towards Yüksekkaldırım, and the light blue towards 
Tophane. ‘God, which one?’ He briefly stopped in the corner. Then followed 
the light brown. Everything happened during that brief stop. He was wrong 
again. The light blue was B. If he had followed her, the story would have 
come to an end. But he went with Güler. Coincidence? He thought not.” 
(Atılgan 2015, 48)14 
 
 
Again, while it might seem that the basis of C’s choices is coincidence, he does not 
think so. If B was indeed the woman he was looking for, choosing her at this very 
                                                     
14 Şimdi köşede iki kız durmuş konuşuyorlardı. Ayakkapları topuksuzdu. Bak bu iyiydi. Yoksa?.. Yüreği çarptı. 
Birinin yağmurluğu devetüyü, öbürününki açık maviydi. İşte ayrılacaklardı. İçinden bağırdı: “Haydi, el sıkışın!” 
Kızlar öpüştüler. […] Köşeye koşarken kızların ikisini de görüyordu. Devetüyü Yüksekkaldırım’dan, açık mavi 
Tophane’den yana yürüyordu. “Tanrım, hangisi?” Köşede bir durdu. Sonra devetüyünün arkasından gitti. Her şey 
o bir anlık duruşta olup bitmişti. Gene yanıldı. Açık mavili B. idi. Onun arkasından gitseydi hikâye bitecekti. Ama 
o Güler’le gitti. Tesadüf mü? Değildi.  
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moment would end the story. Yet, this is not a story about closure but the search itself, 
therefore making Güler’s involvement in the story not a coincidence but a necessary 
element for C’s development. As indicated, Güler’s viewpoint on life does not intersect 
with C’s. It can probably be best observed in her letter to B:  
 
“I wish he understood me, and shared the same dreams as me!.. I was talking 
about Cavidan’s wedding just the other day. ‘Then they didn’t love each 
other,’ he said! I was surprised. ‘Have you ever come across two people who 
really love each other marrying? I have not,’ he said. I wonder what meant by 
‘loving.’ Weird, isn’t it? I can’t understand what he wants. How could a 
person not want a small house, a spouse, two kids? Ah, I get it: From this 
perspective he is like you. Wouldn’t you always say, ‘These are not 
enough!’?” (Ibid, 78)15 
 
The division between Güler’s expectations and C’s is easy to spot. How Güler sees life 
is not dissimilar to the perspective of many others: marriage, children, and a house. To 
content herself with these seems enough for her to find happiness in life. Therefore, it 
can be said that the meaning of life, for her, is intertwined with uniformity and habit 
itself as marriage is bound to drag one into habit, and the repetition of quotidian actions 
are supposed to create uniformity among individuals. This makes her unable to 
comprehend the complexities of C’s character and how he is not satisfied with the 
established norms. While it might seem that Güler is only one character, the main issue 
here is that the perspective of most of the society on life is this way, causing 
discrepancies between characters such as C and the others, casting them aside and 
making them feel alienated. It is worth highlighting that B appears to share C’s notions 
on the inadequateness of common aspirations such as living in a house with a spouse 
and kids. While this might support C’s claim that B was the woman he was looking 
for, it is in reality the search itself that he is after, thus turning the woman into solely 
a metaphor. This can be seen through C’s failure of reaching B various times in the 
novel; first when he is introduced to her as the sister of his friend Sami, secondly, his 
choosing Güler over B when the girls go separate ways, and lastly and most 
                                                     
15 Beni anlasa, o da benimle aynı düşü görse!.. Geçen gün Cavidan’ın evlenmesini anlatıyordum. 
“Sevişmiyorlarmış” demesin mi! Şaştım. “Sen hiç gerçekten sevişen iki insanın evlendiklerini gördün mü? Ben 
görmedim” dedi. Sevişmek dediği acaba neydi? Tuhaf, değil mi? Onun ne istediğini anlayamıyorum. Nasıl olur da 
bir insan, küçük bir evi, bir eşi, iki çocuğu olsun istemez. Ah, buldum işte: Bu bakımdan o da sana benziyor. Sen, 
“Yetmez bunlar!” demez miydin?  
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importantly, when he tries to follow the bus B is in at the end of the novel, yet causing 
an accident and losing the sight of her eventually. 
 
Ayşe, on the other hand, whom the reader only hears about in the first chapter becomes 
involved with C again in the third chapter, titled “Summer.” As mentioned before, she 
formerly had a romantic/sexual relationship with him, before the beginning of the novel, 
and after C terminates his relationship with Güler at the end of Chapter II, he starts seeing 
Ayşe again. Even though she is a painter, an occupation that carries the stigma of being 
useless and unprofitable, compared to C, who holds no occupation at all, she, as well, 
believes she has the right to criticize his ways. While C himself sometimes feels envious 
of Ayşe for having something to occupy her mind unlike him, he feels resolute in his 
belief that she is one of those relying on comfort as well: “Perhaps he was jealous of her 
for painting, something to occupy her mind with. Still, she was comfortable, too” (Ibid, 
111). 16 Ayşe’s view of life is not entirely similar to Güler’s; she agrees to live in sin with 
C and claims to like him more than others as he is not “normal” (Ibid, 116), yet through 
the entries in her diary it can be seen that she is questioning almost his every move and 
fails to understand his conflict and contradictions: “Why is he this delighted upon leaving 
others’ company?” (Ibid, 117). 17 “Marriage! Succumbing to an unknown man’s duty of 
uniting us in a boring office. These are his own words.” (Ibid, 116).18 This might mean 
that she does not share his beliefs yet does not go against him—at least directly—either. 
Like Güler, Ayşe is also caught up within the accepted practices in the society. Even 
though she does not openly say it, it can be claimed that what she wishes is to marry C, 
or at least have some officiality in their relationship. The people around them, whom C 
condemns for not being able to understand their way of living, push marriage not only as 
an obligation to prove one’s genuine feelings, but more as a fulfillment of the “moral” 
codes of society: 
 
“I wonder how long their tolerance for two people who love each other around 
them will last. How anxious they will get when they realize the difference and 
the divergence of this love that surpasses their insufficient scale for love! 
                                                     
16 Belki onu uğraşacağı bir şeyi olduğu, resim yaptığı için kıskanıyordu. Gene de rahattı. 
 
17 Başkalarından ayrıldı mı neden böyle seviniyor?” 
 
18 Evlenmek! Can sıkıcı dairelerden birinde, tanımadığımız bir adamın bizi birleştirmek görevine boyun eğmek. Bu 
onun sözü. 
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They would shun us. They would say we are bad examples for their kids, as 
if we could be worse examples for their kids than their own selves. What do 
all these people that live under this roof have in common? That they believe 
in the obligation of living together. Some like rice with eggplants, some 
without; some salty, some not; some want to go to bed early, some late; some 
want to listen to jazz while the other listens to music. Waking up in the 
morning… Some would talk about their dream. The one who is listening 
doesn’t like listening to dreams. Aren’t spouses even like this, too? What do 
they have in common? Apart from rubbing their skin to each other on 
particular days of the week? Still, they are putting up with it, because they 
believe in the obligation of living together. I differ from them because I don’t 
believe in it. This is the cause of my boredom and my joy. I would rather curl 
into my loneliness than forcing myself to bear this. One person is enough for 
me. A community founded by two people that love each other. Since we are 
social creatures, aren’t these tight, unproblematic two-people societies the 
best of human societies?” (Ibid, 107-8)19 
 
By rejecting the notion of marriage as an obligation, C criticizes both marriage as a 
requirement for the proof of love, and the suppression of sexual freedom within the 
seemingly conservative society. For him, the fact that the disparity between two 
individuals who form what he calls the two-person societies is alone sufficient for 
marriage to become unbearable and be reduced to the act of sharing a roof. A significant 
point here is his claim that these people endure living with each other around what they 
call marriage because they feel obliged to do so. This restrains the individual’s free will, 
which is one of the basic concepts of existential philosophy. Thus, C’s existentialist 
tendencies are undeniably evident in his dismissal of this so-called obligation. Believing 
people should be free to live their lives without such social restraints, C’s idea of two-
person societies focuses on love without having to suffocate it with legal boundaries. It 
is significant that he describes the prototype of the society he believes in as “the society 
founded by two people who love (sevişen) each other. The word “sevişen” comes from 
the word “sevişmek” in Turkish, which carries a double meaning. It both means “to love” 
                                                     
19 Bunların, çevrelerinde sevişen iki insana gösterdikleri bu hoşgörü ne zamana dek sürecek acaba? Bu sevginin 
onlardaki güdük sevgi ölçüsünü aşan başkalığını, törelere uymazlığını görünce nasıl tedirgin olacaklar! Bizi aralarından 
atarlar. Çocuklarına kötü örnek olduğumuzu söylerler. Sanki çocuklarına kendilerinden daha kötü örnek olabilirmişiz 
gibi. Bu çatının altında yaşayanlarda ortak ne var? Yalnız birlikte yaşama zorunluluğuna inanmaları. Kimi pilavı 
patlıcanlı ister, kimi patlıcansız; kimi tuzlu, kimi tuzsuz; kimi erken yatmak ister, kimi geç; biri şarkı dinlerken öteki 
caz müziği ister. Sabahları kalkışlar… Biri gördüğü düşü anlatır. Dinleyen, düş dinlemeyi sevmez. Karı kocalar bile 
böyle değil mi? Ortak neleri var? Haftanın belli günleri et ete sürtünmekten başka? Gene de dayanıyorlar. Çünkü 
birlikte yaşama zorunluluğuna inanmışlar. İşte benim onlardan ayrıldığım buna inanmamam. Sıkıntımın da sevincimin 
de kaynağı bu. Gücün dayanmaktansa yalnızlığıma kaçarım. Bana tek insan yeter. Sevişen iki kişinin kurduğu toplum. 
Toplumsal yaratıklar olduğumuza göre, insan toplumlarının en iyisi bu daracık, sorunsuz, iki kişilik toplumlar değil 
mi? 
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and “to make love.” Thus, C’s claim becomes even more clear, as sexual freedom 
surpasses the boundaries of the legitimacy of love.  
 
The lack of freedom caused by the consideration of marriage as an obligation reminds 
one of Sartre’s famous term: “bad faith.” Translated into English as “self-deception” as 
well, what he means by bad faith is the self-deception humans beings have that they are 
not free to choose and/or do something, although their free will eliminate any imaginary 
obstacle on their way to freedom. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre gives the example of 
a young woman on a date to explain bad faith thoroughly. The woman goes on a date with 
a man she has met recently, knowing that the man eventually will make a move to initiate 
sexual activity. When he puts his hand on her leg at dinner, there are two choices for the 
woman to decide on: one, she can take it as a sexual move and remain aware of its 
intentions to make a decision, to reject or accept the man, as she has the freedom to do 
so. Two, she can ignore the meaning behind the sexual gesture and assume that she does 
not have a choice in the matter. The second is what Sartre calls bad faith, or self-
deception. As the names suggest, someone with bad faith is only deceiving themselves 
by believing that he or she is not free in his or her choices. (Sartre 1993, 55-56). He states 
that: 
 
“To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or 
presenting as truth a pleasing untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the 
structure of falsehood. Only what changes everything is the fact that in bad 
faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth. Thus the duality of the 
deceiver and the deceived does not exist here. Bad faith on the contrary 
implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness.” (Ibid, 49) 
 
As suggested, it is indeed called a self-deception because of the “duality of the deceiver 
and the deceived.” Through the disbelief of freedom, whom the subject harms and/or 
limits is themselves only, hence the self-deception. In a way, it is a self-illusion as the 
subject adheres to the misconception that their free will is nonexistent, or that fate or 
destiny surpasses it, upon which nothing can be done. This, as a result, bad faith pushes 
the subject, or the individual, to inertia and to disillusion. They accept the situation as it 
is and do not strive to pursue an individual choice. This can be applied to C’s claim that 
most people stay in marriages because they do not believe in the existence of another 
option. According to Sartre’s claim then, these people have bad faith, robbing themselves 
of their freedom and having to suffer from the consequences. Moreover, the self-
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deception is so high that they refuse to accept relationships such as C and Ayşe’s that are 
not based on marriage, which they turn into the ultimate deception itself. It can even be 
suggested that Ayşe and Güler carry this bad faith as well. Considering their need and 
desire for formality in their relationships with C, the ultimate being marriage and kids, 
they likewise seem unable to escape this self-illusion. Of course, it can always be 
suggested that unlike Güler, who seems to be thoroughly fixed on the idea of having a 
house, a husband, and kids, Ayşe shows dislike of others’ disapproval on how she and C 
prefer to live: “Why do they concern themselves with how we want to live?” [Atılgan 
2015, 116]20). When confronted by one of their neighbors about when their living in sin 
would come to an end, she responds that there would be no end and it would keep going 
(Ibid, 116). However, it can be observed that when she begins to have suspicions of 
pregnancy, her resolution begins to slip away: “I am three days late this month. It could 
be a sign of pregnancy symptoms.”21 “I am not pregnant. I am extremely ashamed of this 
happiness within me.” (Ibid, 116)22. While the hardships of being a single mother are to 
be taken into account, there is no doubt a society that puts strains on a “two-person 
society” for living in sin would take it even further in the case of an illegitimate child. 
Ayşe’s bad faith here results from her hiding this situation as a “displeasing truth.” Unlike 
C, she has doubts about a life without marriage, let alone having an illegitimate child. It 
could be asked that if marriage is her eventual “faith,” then she could use pregnancy to 
obtain it. This brings us to the fact that C seems to be the only character in the novel that 
has faith in his freedom, and therefore would probably choose not to remain with her and 
his child in such a situation. While his idleness is a means of freedom for C, for Ayşe it 
is the cause of all that is wrong with him and their relationship: “The fault is all on his 
idleness, I wish he at least painted” (Ibid, 127).23 
 
 
2.2. Flâneur or Man of the Crowd? Idling in the City 
 
                                                     
20 Neden istediğimiz gibi yaşamamıza karışıyorlar? 
 
21 Bu ay üç gün gecikti. Gebelik tedirginliklerin öncüsü olabilir. 
 
22 Gebe değilim. İçimdeki bu sevinçten delice utanıyorum. 
 
23 Tüm suç onun aylak oluşunda, bari resim yapsa. 
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An important aspect of C’s character is that, by many literary critics he is considered to 
be a flâneur, although he is not referred as such in the novel. It is, of course, important to 
know what exactly a flâneur is to be able to understand the character and the novel as a 
whole. According to Payne and Barbera’s A Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory, 
a flâneur is the “French term for a city stroller, popularized by Benjamin in his work on 
Baudelaire and nineteenth-century Paris. The flâneur is the cultural consumer as modern 
hero, moving anonymously through the crowd, experiencing city life as a succession of 
compelling but instantaneous impressions” (Payne and Barbera 2010, 278). C is known 
to be an idler in the novel, but he is not a regular one. A major reason he is considered to 
be so is that first of all, he is unemployed, and secondly, he spends most of his time 
wandering around the streets of Istanbul “aimlessly.” I have mentioned before that what 
he claims to be his aim is to find a woman that will give him the true love he is yearning 
for: “Even since I have seen the hypocrisy, hollowness, and the ridiculousness of societal 
values, I have been looking for the only thing I can hold onto that is not ridiculous: True 
love! A woman.” (Atılgan 2015, 149)24. Moreover, it is already known that he has the 
tendency to go after women he does not know on the street, hoping they will turn out to 
be the woman he is looking for, which is how he meets Güler. This might bring up a 
debate about whether C is indeed a flâneur if his only aim to in flânerie is to pursue and 
go after women. As also mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter, it can be observed 
that behind the wanderings and idling of C, there lies a larger issue than love. “The 
woman,” in a way, becomes a metaphor for what he actually is looking for, which, 
through his existentialist angst and self-doubt, I claim to be a sense of meaning in life and 
a desire for full self-awareness. Thus, while C hides behind the search for love, with or 
without being aware of it, he analyzes life and the society by means of flânerie, which 
leads to his understanding of everyday life as absurd. Moreover, he also tends to 
demonstrate his profound connection with the city during his wanderings: “He loved this 
freshly illuminated city. What he was searching for was here, among these people passing 
by.” (Atılgan 2015, 30). 25 What he is looking for, whether love or meaning, is intertwined 
with the city itself, and thus encourages his flânerie.  
                                                     
24 Ben, toplumdaki değerlerin ikiyüzlülüğünü, sahteliğini, gülünçlüğünü göreli beri, gülünç olmayan tek tutamağı 
arıyorum: Gerçek sevgiyi! Bir kadın. 
 
25 Işıklarını yeni yakmış bu şehri seviyordu. Aradığı burda, şu gelip geçen insanların içindeydi. 
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As already mentioned, Walter Benjamin’s essay on Baudelaire, called “On Some Motifs 
in Baudelaire,” is considered to be a major text on flânerie. There, he makes a distinction 
between Baudelaire’s flâneur and what Edgar Allan Poe calls a “man of the crowd.” C 
was interpreted by many as a flâneur, yet his idling takes place among the crowd as well. 
Even the first sentence of the novel refers to a crowd: “All of a sudden, I realized that she 
could be among this crowd, on this pavement overflowing with people” (Ibid, 9, my 
italics). According to Benjamin, though, the man of the crowd is not the same thing as 
the flâneur (Benjamin 1992, 168). Benjamin states that “the man of the crowd is no 
flâneur. In him, composure has given way to manic behavior. Hence he exemplifies, 
rather, what had to become of the flâneur once he was deprived of the milieu to which he 
belonged” (Ibid, 168). Thus, to be able to determine whether C is a flâneur or a man of 
the crowd one has to answer the question of whether he fits into his surroundings. This 
might come as a challenging question at first, as he seems to have a special bond with the 
city, yet not quite so with its crowd. Throughout the novel, he seems to detach himself 
from others, from the “overflowing crowd,” and apart from when he is with his 
girlfriends, he seems to loiter or idle on his own. His avoidance of others can also be 
inferred from his desire to create his own “two-person society,” whose occurrence seems 
doubtful whether he ever finds the woman he is looking for or not, as he himself begins 
questioning if it is possible to detach oneself from others at all: “What if one could never 
be freed from the others?” (Atılgan 2015, 119).26 Furthermore, C does not seem to have 
a profound connection with any of the characters he seems to meet in the novel, or with 
the people that pass as his “friends,” a problem caused by the fact that his thoughts on 
life, love, and the way of the world differ from almost everyone else around him. Thus, 
it might be claimed that his milieu cannot seem to meet his mentality. Plus, it can also be 
argued that he also contains the “manic behavior” that Benjamin claims to be a 
characteristic of the man of the crowd. One reason for this is his psycho-sexual problems 
resulting from the fact that his turbulent and disorderly relationship with his father, 
despite his being dead for years, is still haunting him and shaping his relationships with 
people, and most importantly, with women. Because of his father’s incorrigible obsession 
with women and sex, the breaking point being C’s realizing that his father had been 
having sex with C’s aunt, whom he deeply loved and saw as a mother figure, (“Since his 
                                                     
26 Yoksa kişi, dışarıdakilerden hiç mi kurtulamayacaktı? 
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childhood, perhaps because of her aunt, he had been disgusted by his father” [Ibid, 12]27), 
he begins to detest both him and his own sexual desire: “Probably, no one suffered from 
being created as a man as much as I had. I would read constantly to be able to rid myself 
of that stinging desire deep within for a woman. It wasn’t working.” (Ibid, 123)28. While 
this might not seem like a serious manic behavior, from a psychoanalytic perspective it 
does leave a negative effect on his connection with sexuality, resulting in his poor 
relationship with women that leads him into further alienation. In all this, while C is said 
to be a flâneur, I think he fits more into Poe’s idea of the “man of the crowd,” if, according 
to Benjamin’s claim, there has to be a separation between the two. 
 
Nevertheless, flâneur or man of the crowd, it cannot be denied that behind the action of 
C’s walking lies a restlessness and a sense of non-belonging. As walking itself is a 
constant shift between departure and arrival from one place to another, it makes it hardly 
possible for the individual to have a perception of home. Michael de Certeau explains this 
in The Practice of Everyday Life through his remarks that walking carries the connotation 
of search, thus erasing the presence of an attachment to a specific and/or permanent place: 
 
“To walk is to lack a place. It is the indefinite process of being absent and in 
search of a proper. The moving about that the city multiplies and concentrates 
makes the city itself an immense social experience of social place—an 
experience that is, to be sure, broken up into countless tiny deportations 
(displacements and walks), compensated for by the relationships and 
intersections of these exoduses that intertwine and create an urban fabric, and 
placed under the sign. Of what ought to be, ultimately, the place but is only a 
name, the City.” (de Certeau 1984, 103) 
 
What Certaeu means by “proper” is “a spatial or institutional localization” (p. xix), in 
other words, it becomes a place which might provide one with a sense of belonging. When 
we look at C, in spite of the fact that he has a physical house and much money that can 
take him anywhere, he is far from being able to pin himself down to a place. Even though 
he comes back to his house almost every night, he still lacks a place as belonging is 
something more than physicality. Furthermore, the thought of having to abide by a place 
is scary to him: “He was afraid of becoming accustomed to. […] It was bad for him to 
                                                     
27 Eskiden beri, belki teyzesi yüzünden, hep iğrenirdi babasından. 
 
28 Hiç kimse erkek yaratılmanın azabını benim kadar çekmemiştir. İçimdeki batıcı kadın isteğinden kurtulmak için 
boyuna okurdum. Olmuyordu. 
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have a place. Then, one would begin to live according to the wishes of that place, rather 
than their own” (Atılgan 2015, 69)29. Hence, it could be said that Certeau’s analysis fits 
the case of C; walking, for him, is more than the act itself. It becomes a metaphor for a 
search for his place in the world, a conundrum that has been intriguing Existentialists for 
centuries. This means that in the novel, walking, flânerie, and/or being the man of the 
crowd are all interrelated through Existentialism; it is this existential angst that ultimately 
fuels all what other people see as problematic in C, such as his idling, aloofness, and 
wandering. Yet, walking does turn the city into a social experience as discussed in 
Certeau. It is by means of walking that C meets Güler:  
 
“After they passed Tünel and pulled themselves away from the crowd, the 
noise, and began walking along that deserted street which gave the impression 
of a place that was once built meticulously, but was later disapproved and 
abandoned, he finally understood her. Güler glanced at him and slowed down. 
So, she wanted to talk here. Their first conversation was going take place in 
the street she chose.” (Ibid, 54)30 
 
This, I believe, is significant because even when C is sure she is not the woman he is 
looking for, her entrance into his life and their relationship have an effect and shifts his 
life to some extent. The fact that she is a university student also begins to determine the 
places of their meetings as well. For instance, one of these places is a patisserie, a popular 
destination for romantic dates at the time. While this does not mean that C is not used to 
be, and eat, among people, as he constantly eats out every day in different restaurants, he 
does not particularly belong either in Güler’s social circle or in the social experience that 
their relationship takes him. This is where spatiality itself becomes significant, as it 
becomes a part of C’s search as well. Even when he is with other women, in the cinema, 
patisserie, or a summer house, his search is continuing, which is one more reason to claim 
that the woman is merely a metaphor for his pursuit.  
  
Orhan Koçak likens Atılgan’s map of C’s flanerie to a kind of Bermuda Triangle, 
revolving around Karaköy, Taksim, and Nişantaşı, three of Istanbul’s most central and 
crowded neighborhoods (Koçak 2017, 49). One reason for this is undoubtedly linked to 
                                                     
29 Alışmaktan korkuyordu […] Bir yerleri olması kötüydü. Sonra insan kendinin değil, o yerin isteğine uygun yaşamaya 
başlardı. 
 
30 Tünel'i geçip, kalabalıktan, gürültüden kurtulunca onu, insanların önce özene bezene yaptıkları, sonra beğenmeyip 
bıraktıkları bir yer duygusunu veren tenha sokakta yürürlerken anladı. Güler ona bakmış, yavaşlamıştı. Demek burada 
konuşmak istiyordu. İlk konuşmaları onun seçtiği sokakta olacaktı. 
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his economic status, as these neighborhoods are, and were, also among the most 
expensive in the city. Thanks to his tormenting father’s inheritance, C is able to carry out 
his walking and search in this “triangle.” The actual term Koçak uses is the “Bermuda 
Triangle of Devil” (Bermuda Şeytan Üçgeni), a popularized usage of the term in Turkish 
that carries an evil attribution as a result of the distressing and mysterious disappearances 
in the area. In Atılgan’s Aylak Adam, the evilness of this triangle is debatable, yet my 
claim is that C tends to create his major criticism, habit, through this triangle. While he 
tries to escape it by eating out in different restaurants every day and following unknown 
women to isolated, narrow streets, the stability of his route in a way is the very thing that 
leads him to habit and repetition, which he considers as absurd, and the killer of all 
originality and uniqueness, thus adding the evilness into the triangle.  
 
Nonetheless, even if his route might seem stable and even “evil,” his constant search for 
meaning in life, which he tries to realize by walking also explains why this is considered 
as the first city novel in Turkish. C’s character and the city merge into one, the city 
becoming an inseparable part of him, the channel of his search: “His ears were ringing 
with the buzzing of the large city. Perhaps, the footsteps he was searching for were among 
this buzzing, too. He turned and began walking towards one of the vast streets where 
people and cars were merging together.” (Atılgan 2015, 44)31. 
 
 
2.3. Habit, or the Inescapable Loop of the Absurdity of Everyday Life 
 
 
Until now, I have tried to examine and demonstrate the differences in C’s character and 
how this alienates him from the society he lives in, as his attempt to escape the daily 
routine of things, or in other words, habit, gradually drags him toward instability. His 
existential tendencies, fueled by his constant wanderings through the streets and in the 
crowd, bring him face to face with his ultimate object: subverting the order that he truly 
despises, an order that revolves around repetition and tedium. I have discussed before that 
C’s perception on love and the world itself differs from others’; he refuses to work, he is 
unable to keep stable relationships with women, and he does not believe in the “sanctity” 
                                                     
31 Kulaklarında büyük şehrin uğultusu vardı. Belki aranan ayak sesleri de bu uğultunun içindeydi. Döndü. İnsanların, 
arabaların kaynaştığı büyük caddelerden yana yürüdü. 
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of marriage, neither does he consider it to be necessary. In fact, its very existence is an 
obstacle in the way of happiness, formed by the unending criticism of others. C sees 
repetition as a nightmare; he feels the suffocation caused by doing the same things every 
day, passing by the same road, seeing the same people constantly, and so on, which is the 
main justification for his idleness and solitude, because in jobs and marriages habit is 
inevitable at some point. Even in his relationships with women, his deepest fear lies in 
habit, and becoming accustomed to places, people, actions, and others: 
 
“He devoured the orange juice the waiter put on the table. He was thirsty. It 
was probably because of the scrambled eggs with sausages he had just eaten. 
When he asked for eggs with sausages at the restaurant, the waiter said ‘—
Our bacon is great, sir. If you’d like, I could have it made with bacon instead,’ 
upon which he stared at the waiter and said ‘I want it with sausages.’ The 
waiter here wasn’t like that. He didn’t bother to talk. He would take the extra 
money he left on the table when they left, and wouldn’t saying ‘goodbye’ to 
them. If he did, they wouldn’t be meeting here like they had done five times, 
but at another patisserie with a lot of customers like this one. Every time he 
came here, he was surprised to find that the waiter was still not fired. He 
wanted him to be fired, and wanted a flattering, clingy, authentic waiter to 
replace him so he wouldn’t be meeting Güler always at this table. He was 
scared of becoming used to.” (Ibid, 69)32 
 
This shows that while C criticizes people for bowing down to habit and building their 
lives around it, he is well aware of the tendency human beings, including himself, have 
for it, hence the cause of his anxiety. It takes him to the point of wishing that the sulky 
waiter were fired, so that he could get rid of his usual place before beginning to feel an 
attachment to it or becoming accustomed to going there on a constant basis. Even the fact 
that they sit at the same table turns into a form of adaption, thus requires him to avoid it. 
He states that he comprehends the idea behind becoming accustomed: “He could 
understand becoming accustomed. There, even the human brain had the tendency to 
become used to and keep repeating the same thing” (Ibid, 41)33. This is significant as it 
shows that C’s contradictions and opposition to the order of things is not caused because 
                                                     
32 Garsonun masaya bıraktığı portakal suyunu bir solukta içti. Susamıştı. Az önce yediği sucuklu yumurtadan olacaktı. 
Lokantadaki garsondan sucuklu yumurta isteyince, "— Pastırmamız çok iyidir efendim. İsterseniz pastırmalı 
yaptırayım," diyen adama dik dik, "Sucuklu istiyorum," demişti. Buradaki garson öyle değildi. Konuşmağa 
yeltenmiyordu. Ayrılırlarken masanın ucuna fazladan bıraktığı parayı alıyor, arkalarından, "güle güle" bile demiyordu. 
Dese, Güler'le beş sefer de bu aynı yerde değil, gene buna benzer, gireni çıkanı bol bir başka pastanede buluşurlardı. 
Buraya her gelişinde adamın işinden atılmamış olmasına şaşardı. Atılsın, yerine sulu, yılışık, gerçek bir garson gelsin 
de Güler'le hep bu masada buluşmasınlar istiyordu. Alışmaktan korkuyordu 
 
33 Alışmayı anlıyordu. İşte insan beyni bile alışıyor, hep aynı şeyi tekrarlıyordu. 
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he does not understand it, but vice versa. While he holds the fear within himself, he acts 
out to break the hypnotic effect of habit, even if it comes out as an absurd reaction. His 
anger against people who are contented with living a life of repetition is induced by his 
belief that the reason why others do not forgo habit is because it is comfortable and 
known. They simply do not bother to leave their comfort zones, aware or unaware that 
there is something much more: “They are comfortable within their molds. I am not like 
them.” (Ibid, 144)34. While comfort is a means of happiness and satisfaction for many, it 
is the root of habit, and therefore scares him as much: “This much comfort is scaring me. 
I wish at least I became sick for a few days” (Ibid, 114)35. This also might sound absurd 
to many, that he wishes for sickness to be able to leave the comfort that most are seeking, 
yet C sees habit as the real absurdity, the reason everyday life has become absurd, as it 
lacks novelty and stimulation. By using a metaphor of tree branches, he draws a 
distinction between the ones living by comfort, and the others—like him—who strive for 
more in life, discontent with the common: 
 
“Kuyara is the comfort coming from the continuation of familiar pleasures. 
Sleeping without thinking. The comfort of the constant passing of days. What 
about adako? I don’t know if you have ever noticed the tendency of tree 
branches to separate themselves from the trunk. It always grows further. It is 
an escape from the comfort of the trunk that took roots in the earth. A thirst 
for freedom. I call this ‘the tree branch complex.’ […] The one who got the 
tree branch complex is anxious. Just like the way people prune branches to 
keep them closer to the trunk, one’s relatives also prune this Adako within the 
one. They do everything they can to prevent them from separating themselves 
from the trunk. On some people nothing works. They are the rebellious 
branch. They separate. No axe can bring them down.” (Ibid, 127)36 
 
This is quite the ideal metaphor to make this distinction between his character and the 
others. By defining the ones with “tree branch complex,” C is actually describing himself, 
perhaps alluding to the notion that others see him as problematic, or even disordered. 
Plus, the idea that they try to keep the ones like C down, by trying to mold—or prune in 
                                                     
34 Onlar kalıplarının içinde rahat. Onlardan değilim ben. 
 
35 Bu kadar rahatlık beni korkutuyor. Hiç olmazsa birkaç gün sürecek bir hastalığa tutulsam. 
 
36 Kuyara, alışılmış tatların sürüp gitmesindeki rahatlıktır. Düşünmeden uyuyuvermek. Biteviye geçen günlerin 
kolaylığı. Ya adako? Ağaç dalındaki, gövdeden ayrılma eğilimini fark ettin mi bilmem? Hep öteye uzar. Gövdenin 
toprağa kök salmış rahatlığından ötürü bir kaçıştır bu. Özgürlüğe susamışlık. Buna ben ‘ağaç dalı kompleksi’ diyorum.  
[…] Ağaç dalı kompleksine tutulmuş kişi tedirgindir. İnsanların ağaç dallarını budayıp gövdeye yaklaştırdıkları gibi, 
yakınları onun içindeki bu Adako’yu da budarlar. Onu gövdeden ayırmamak için ellerinden geleni yaparlar. Kimi 
insana ne yapılsa yararı olmaz. Asi daldır o. Ayrılır. Balta işlemez ona. 
 27 
 
this case—them with social stereotypes, such as marriage, could be validated. As one 
remembers his relationship with Ayşe and Güler, both of whom wanted to change, or 
least wished for change, in his character, C’s claim that others try to “prune” rebel souls 
such as himself becomes justified.    
 
As an existentialist hero, C’s notions on absurdity remind one of none other than Albert 
Camus, perhaps the best-known name of Absurdism. Atılgan’s characters, especially C 
and Zebercet (from Anayurt Oteli) were criticized by some as being Camus-like, and 
when comparing Camus’s point of view to C’s, it can be inferred that they indeed intersect 
at some point.  Basically, Camus’ idea was that existence itself is absurd, because the 
individual is looking for a meaning in life when there happens to be none at all. In The 
Myth of Sisyphus, he likens the situation of human beings to the story of Sisyphus from 
Greek Mythology. Sisyphus was condemned by the gods to roll a boulder up a hill every 
day, only for it to roll down at night, turning all his efforts into futility. Camus claimed 
that like Sisyphus, human beings live their lives repeating the same things over again, 
similar to C’s thoughts on habit. Camus also states that the absurdity of this is related to 
consciousness: “If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. Where would 
his torture be, indeed, if at every step the hope of succeeding upheld him? The workman 
of today works every day in his life at the same tasks, and this fate is no less absurd. But 
it is tragic only at the rare moments when it becomes conscious.” (Camus, 185). This 
might give an idea on the reason for C’s misery on the structure of life, as he is aware of 
the status quo forcing others to repetition. As a result, his own life turns into a tragedy, 
while others keep living a life of unawareness and satisfaction, something he rebels 
against: “‘Why? Why are you all like this?’ He was on his own in a world that was created 
to be contented with what’s there, without searching, without thinking.” (Atılgan 2015, 
152)37.  
 
The response Camus presents for the absurdity of life is suicide: “There is but one truly 
serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth 
living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.” (Camus, 10). The 
conundrum here is that if life is indeed meaningless, then there is hardly any difference 
                                                     
37 “Neden? Neden böylesiniz?” Olanla yetinerek, aramadan, düşünmeden yaşanılsın diye yaratılmış bir dünyada 
yalnızdı. 
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between keeping living and committing suicide. This might also be the reason why the 
novel does not end with C’s suicide. Close to the end, he takes off his clothes, goes into 
the water and keeps moving forward, giving the impression that he is going to kill himself:  
 
“He walked in the sea. He could hear the cold line of the water slowly rising 
on his body: From his feet to his calves, then his knees and legs… Then his 
underwear got soaked. It was a male’s underwear. He wondered if his father 
also used to swim. There was no salvation. “Why not? Being bit by fish teeth 
in the silence of the bottom of the sea… There was a boy at school with fish-
like eyes. Why wouldn’t there be fish with human-like eyes, too? I am so 
exhausted… He turned with all his energy and let himself go straightly. “The 
bottom of the sea doesn’t accept human corpses.” When his feet stepped on 
the slippery pebbles after what seemed like a long descending to him, his head 
stayed above the water. This bodiless head was probably looking weird. At 
the time he was wondering who would find his clothes if he were to drown.” 
(Atılgan 2015, 132-33)38 
 
His (self-)despair and exhaustion with the world can be observed, and although it cannot 
be claimed for sure that his first intention was suicide when he goes into the water, he 
does consider the thought. Atılgan himself told in an interview that he actually considered 
killing off C, but decided against it in the end, thinking it would be too melancholic 
(Andak 1992, 61). If we take Camus’s concept of suicide as a base, then it could also be 
said that C might be well-aware of the fact that dead or alive, he will not be able to subvert 
the order he is against: “Perhaps, he could only subvert this order in his dreams.” (Atılgan 
2015, 47).39 So, while there is an ongoing relation between existentialism, absurdity, and 
suicide, the last is less of a solution than a reaction. C’s death will make little to no affect 
in others’ lives, and they would keep going on living the life that they know based on 
comfort and habit.  
 
While C does not commit suicide, his psychology seems to deteriorate through the end of 
the novel, implying signs of madness. Perhaps the reason is that his hope of finding what 
he is looking for is dwindling away to nothing, realizing that there might indeed be no 
                                                     
38 Denizin içine yürüdü. Soğuk su çizgisinin bedenindeki yavaştan yükselişini duyuyordu: Ayaklarından baldırlarına, 
dizlerine, bacaklarına... Sonra donu ıslandı. Bu bir erkek donuydu. Gözlerini kapayıp atladı. Acaba babası da yüzer 
miydi? Kurtuluş yoktu. “Neden yokmuş! Deniz dibinin suskunluğunda balık dişleriyle ısırılmak... Okulda balık gözlü 
bir çocuk vardı. Neden insan gözlü balıklar olmasın? Öyle yorgunum ki!..” Bütün gücüyle dönüp kendini dimdik 
bıraktı. “Deniz dibi insan leşini kabul etmez.” Ona çok uzun gelen bir inişin sonunda ayakları kaygan çakıllara bastığı 
zaman başı suyun üstünde kaldı. Bu bedensiz kafanın tuhaf bir görünüşü olmalıydı. Şu an onun içinden, boğulsaydı 
giysilerini kimin bulacağı geçiyordu. 
 
39 Belki bu düzeni ancak düşlerinde bozardı. 
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meaning life bears. “[C] has lost all his values, he is looking for something to hold on to. 
I won’t be surprised if he goes completely crazy soon” (Ibid, 152).40 Adding to his 
psychological problems dating back to his childhood, these upcoming sings of madness 
only add to what Benjamin calls “manic behavior” that defines the man of the crowd. 
Moreover, madness might also be C’s reaction to the ongoing and endless absurdity of 
life and his awareness of his inability to do something against it. In a way, both suicide 
and madness are the end of self-awareness, yet considering that the latter is not chosen 
by the individual, it adds more desperation, and in my belief melancholy (contrary to what 
Atılgan said), to the tone of the novel towards the end. Camus states at the end of The 
Myth of Sisyphus that “[o]ne must imagine Sisyphus happy” (Camus, 189). Even though 
it is apparent that he is not, by choosing to imagine him as happy, the individual chooses 
to disregard the discomfort of the absurdity of life. So perhaps the reader of Aylak Adam 
could follow the same and imagine C as sane, the difference it would make being 
debatable. 
 
In the end, whether ignorance is bliss or not, there is little doubt that if life is indeed 
meaningless as Camus claims; C’s search for meaning, love, or another way of life is as 
pointless as Sisyphus’ pushing the boulder up every day, as it will result in nothing. The 
end of the novel just proves it; right when he finally finds B, the woman whom he believes 
to be his true love, he throws himself in front of a taxi to be able to follow the bus she 
mounts, leading to a fight with the taxi driver instead when he causes a car accident. It 
results in his missing her as the bus disappears out of his sight, most probably for good: 
“He remained silent. Talking was useless. He was never going to mention her to anyone, 
again. He knew they wouldn’t understand” (Atılgan 2015, 155).41 
  
                                                     
40 Bütün değerlerini yitirmiş, dayanacak bir şey arıyor. Yakında büsbütün kaçırırsa şaşmam. 
 
41 Sustu. Konuşmak gereksizdi. Bundan sonra kimseye ondan söz etmeyecekti. Biliyordu, anlamazlardı. 
 30 
 
 
 
 
 
3. JULIO CORTÁZAR AND RAYUELA: THE (EXISTENTIALIST) LATIN 
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL 
 
 
 
3.1. “The Situation of the Latin American Intellectual”: Julio Cortázar and 
Rayuela’s Horacio Oliveira 
 
 
When Julio Cortázar penned his noted article “The Situation of the Latin American 
Intellectual” in 1967, he had been in the 16th year of his self-imposed exile: 
  
“I’ve been living outside Latin America for sixteen years now, and that I think 
of myself above all as a cronopio who writes novels and short stories with no 
other end than the one which is passionately pursued by all cronopios: my 
own delight. I have to make a real effort to understand that despite these 
idiosyncrasies, I am nonetheless a Latin American intellectual.” (Cortázar 
2010, 341)  
 
Although he was born in Brussels, Belgium in 1914, Cortázar grew up in Buenos Aires 
as his parents were originally from Argentina, and lived there until 1951 when he left for 
Europe for good upon Juan Perón’s rise to power, since as a socialist Cortázar’s ideology 
did not match with the regime of Perón. Even before Perón’s rise to power, Cortázar 
became involved in a fight as a result of this disparity of ideologies: “In 1945–46, since I 
knew I was going to lose my job because I’d been in the fight against Perón, when Perón 
won the presidential election, I resigned before I was backed against the wall as so many 
colleagues who held onto their jobs were.” (Harss & Dohmann 1967, 214-25). Moreover, 
this results in his incarceration, very similar to Atılgan’s situation (as he, too, was sent to 
jail as a result of his claimed involvement in communism), and his eventual 
migration/self-exile to Paris upon Perón’s victory in the upcoming elections. In “The 
Situation of the Latin American Intellectual,” he defines himself as a cronopio, type of 
fictional person he introduces in Historias de cronopios y de famas. The book divides 
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people into different types of imaginary beings, including famas and esperanzas apart 
from cronopios. He defines cronopios as being “disordered and tepid” (Cortázar 1999, 
166) yet also not easily disheartened in the face of trouble and setback (Ibid, 164). The 
reason why he likens himself to a cronopio could be open to discussion, yet in my opinion, 
one reason can be given as the fact that even his exile cannot come in the way of his 
connection with his roots, with Latin America, and does not deter him from calling 
himself a “Latin American Intellectual,” rather than a European one. However, he goes 
on to explain that even though he defines himself as Latin American, his exile from 
Argentina and the probable continuation of his life in Europe cannot be disregarded and 
is also a part of his identity: “The fact that my books have been available for years in 
Latin America does not negate the deliberate and irreversible fact that I left Argentina in 
1951 and that I still live in a European country which I chose for no other reason than my 
sovereign desire to live and write in what for me would be the fullest, most satisfying 
way” (Cortázar 2010, 341). Thus, this prolific Latin American intellectual who rose to be 
one of the most read authors of Latin American literature finds solace in 20th century 
Paris, and writes many of his most famous works—including Rayuela—there.  
 
When the question of his Latin Americanness is set, there emerges another: what exactly 
makes him an intellectual? His contribution to the literary community through the 
abundance of his published works is sufficient for him to qualify as an intellectual, plus 
his knowledge on philosophy and classics, yet his background plays a critical role as well. 
As mentioned before, he was born in Brussels as his parents were diplomats, and as a 
result he had knowledge of French—his first language-- from a young age, and later 
became fluent in English, too—as observed in the many interviews he gives and the letters 
he writes. Moreover, his travels abroad, including the United States and Cuba, are sure to 
have contributed to both his writing and his sense of understanding the world, yet it is his 
ability above all to combine all of it within literature to create the uniqueness of his 
characters, within the frame of such universal concepts and/or problems such as 
Existentialism, as observed in Rayuela, which he himself calls a “human problem”: “I 
took up an existential problem [in the process of writing ‘The Pursuer’], a human problem 
which was later amplified in The Winners, and above all in Hopscotch (Rayuela)” (Harss 
and Dohmann 1967, 224, my italics). The reflection of his success in analyzing human 
psyche is apparent in Rayuela, and most importantly in the character of Horacio Oliveira, 
who, despite being an Argentine expat in Paris, can portray the problems and the crises 
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of all humanity, holding Rayuela’s place as Cortázar’s masterpiece and most famous 
work to the day.  
 
Where does Existentialism come into the scene? It is known that Cortázar wrote and 
published Rayuela in Paris, in 1963 to be exact, four years after the publication of Aylak 
Adam in Turkey. As Paris is famously referred to as the “capital” of philosophy and, 
especially, Existentialism, it is no wonder that Cortázar was highly influenced by the 
movement. In fact, he even mentions in his letters that he was able to meet and talk with 
Camus himself: “Gallimard’s aforementioned cocktail gave me the grand happiness of 
being able to talk for a long time with Camus. When I recognized him […] I approached 
him with all the violence of shy people, I told him that I had translated one of his essays, 
and he joined the conversation warmly” (Cortázar 2012, 345, my translation).42 
Belonging in the literary circle of Paris, keeping in contact with such figures as Camus 
was not an unattainable goal. Hence, Paris molds and shapes the writing of Cortázar, 
especially Rayuela, yet as the Latin American intellectual it is significant to examine how 
Existentialism also spread and rose to popularity in Latin America, as well. 
 
Even before it was a major movement in Europe and the Anglophone world, 
Existentialism was broadly existent in Latin American philosophy. While it gained a 
larger audience upon the translations of European Existentialists such as Gabriel Marcel 
and Jean-Paul Sartre into Spanish, it was ahead of its time as when the movement was at 
its pinnacle in the United States during the 1960s, the philosophers in Latin America had 
proceeded to newer movements and ideas by that time (Toledo 2011, 215). It is also 
known that Cortázar’s first exposure to Existentialism goes back to his time in Buenos 
Aires before he leaves for Paris. He mentions the name of Sartre in one of his letters to 
his friend Luis Gagliardi: “Do you know anything by [Sartre]? They translated one of his 
stories in Sur, ‘The Room’ (‘La Chambre’). An atrocious, monstrous, admirable thing. 
And then, when I read that story, I felt a curiosity for the works of the author, and I knew 
that being very young and vastly known in France as an acclaimed psychologist and 
philosopher on topics with Bergsonian tones, experimented with novel writing through 
                                                     
 
42 El susodicho cocktail de Gallimard (al que fui con Enrique Revol) me dio la gran alegría de poder charlar largo rato 
con Camus. Cuando le reconocí […] me le acerqué con toda la violencia de los tímidos, le dije que había traducido un 
ensayo suyo, y él entró cordialmente en la charla. 
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his work La Nausee, and later with some stories.” (Cortázar 2012, 137, my translation).43 
Thus, Cortázar’s first encounter with Sartre and his work takes place through his 
exploration of one of Sartre’s stories and he later develops an interest to his work. His 
apparent interest in Sartre and his philosophy only grows as he later translates The 
Existential Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre into Spanish and publishes it in 1951 (Harris 
2009, 5).  
 
While Cortázar’s starting point with Existentialism is back where his roots are, in Latin 
America, it cannot be ignored that his time in France (twelve years between his relocation 
to Paris and the publication of Rayuela) leaves its consequential impacts on the book. 
Still, it is useful to look at the history of Latin America—and of Argentina within it—to 
be able to observe the place of Rayuela in Latin American literature thoroughly and 
examine why it is considered as a pioneering work. When the book was published in Paris 
in 1963, Arturo Illia gained the majority vote in the 1963 elections in Argentina and 
became the new president upon the annulment of the election of 1962, officially starting 
the Post-Peronist era (Skidmore & Smith 2005, 93). Latin America in general, on the 
other hand, was dealing with the consequences of the Cold War, while the marks of the 
Second World War were still lingering. The 1960s were also the beginning of what would 
come to be called the “boom” in Latin American literature, a literary movement where 
major writers came to write and publish prolifically and be read in Latin America and 
Europe alike. Apart from Cortázar, the “boom” included many of the major writers of 
Latin American literature that are still widely read and known, such as Gabriel Garcia 
Marquéz from Columbia, Carlos Fuentes from Mexico, Mario Vargas Llosa from Peru, 
and Jorge Luis Borges from Argentina. In fact, the literature that was produced during 
the boom was considered groundbreaking, inspired by the modernists, yet offering 
something new at the same time, such as the emergence of “Magical Realism,” a 
movement that started in Latin America mostly through the works of Marquéz. What is 
called “the New Novel” also emerged at that time, a novel that challenged the 
acknowledged norms of traditional novel writing. Cortázar’s Rayuela was considered as 
one and played a significant part in its emergence: “[T]he post-war era was the moment 
                                                     
43 ¿Conoce usted algo de [Sartre]? En Sur, se tradujo uno de sus cuentos: “El aposento”. Algo atroz, monstruoso, 
admirable. Ya entonces, cuando leí a ese relato, sentí curiosidad por la obra del autor, y supe que, muy joven aun, y 
vastamente conocido en Francia como psicólogo y filosofo consagrado a temas de tono bergsoniano, había incursionado 
en la novela con una obra, La Nausee, y luego algunos cuentos.  
 
 34 
 
in which the Faulknerian impulse predominated in Latin American fiction and that the 
Joycean mode would only fully crystallize in the 1960s, after the publication of Cortázar’s 
Rayuela in 1963.” (Martin 1998, 172).  
 
Indeed, Rayuela is no ordinary novel; it was not when it was first published almost sixty 
years ago, and it still continues to intrigue its readers today. The structure of the novel 
was considered as one of the first of its kind; its structure is not linear and there are 
multiple ways the book can be read. Cortázar divided the book into three parts: “From 
the Other Side,” “From This Side,” and “From Diverse Sides,” the last one consisting of 
extendable chapters. The chapters in the first part take place in Paris, those of the second 
in Buenos Aires. The structure of the novel is challenging, as Cortázar offers two different 
ways of reading the novel. At the beginning, he welcomes the reader with a “Table of 
Instructions,” in which the chapters—155 in total—are put into a specific order. The first 
way to read the novel is linearly, until Chapter 56, where the novel is supposed to end 
when read in this sequence. The second way, Cortázar explains, is read through the list 
he presents, starting with Chapter 73, followed by Chapter 1-2-166, and so on. Of course, 
the reader can also start from the beginning an read all the 156 Chapters in a linear way—
which also seems to be the only way to read all the chapters as Cortázar does not include 
Chapter 55 in the second method—this was not a proposed method by Cortázar himself, 
still every text is open to any kind of reading, thus it surely could be possible. This 
structure reminds one why the novel is called Rayuela, or Hopscotch; in a way, the reader 
jumps through the chapters to read the novel. Moreover, it also suggests why this was 
considered as a pioneering “new novel;” through Rayuela, Cortázar experimented with 
language and structure, and brought down the walls of traditional novel-writing with the 
elimination of linearity and completeness. In fact, George Lukács explains in The Theory 
of the Novel that novel as an art form is supposed to be incomplete if it is to escape 
imperfection: 
 
“The novel is the art-form of virile maturity: this means that the completeness 
of the novel's world, if seen objectively, is an imperfection, and if subjectively 
experienced, it amounts to resignation. The danger by which the novel is 
determined is twofold: either the fragility of the world may manifest itself so 
crudely that it will cancel out the immanence of meaning which the form 
demands, or else the longing for the dissonance to be resolved, affirmed and 
absorbed into the work may be great that it will lead to a premature closing 
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of the circle of the novel's world, causing the form to disintegrate into 
disparate, heterogeneous parts”. (Lukács 1971, 71-72.) 
 
Lukács’ claim of the incomplete novel as the accomplished can be applied to the case of 
Rayuela. Apart from being an open-ended book, when read according to the two methods 
Cortázar suggests, the book is never thoroughly finished; one reading disregards almost 
the half of the book, and the second excludes a chapter. Its incompleteness, therefore, 
could generate a form that is bereft of imperfections, although perfection itself is a 
constructed and subjective term. Still, Rayuela’s innovative structure does not force a 
“premature closing” as Lukács suggests, yet it does include a fragmented form, albeit not 
heterogenous. In other words, Rayuela’s plot is fragmented as it is not linear, and is mixed 
with extendable chapters (some of them composed solely of fragments from other 
authors’ and philosophers’ works) yet no chapter ever repeats itself or can be regarded on 
the same level, thus making it challenging to call it “heterogenous.” This can, at some 
point, hint the novel’s level of convolution and entanglement. In fact, Carlos Fuentes once 
called the novel a “Pandora’s box” or, “caja de Pandora,” alluding to its complexity. 
(Fuentes 1969, 67). It is also known in Latin American literature as a contranovela44, or 
anti-novela, a type of novel that rejects the usage of conventional forms. As seen in the 
structure and form of Rayuela, it is, therefore, not too difficult to recognize why it is 
called so. As a matter of fact, the novel is not the only “opposition;” the anti-novel creates 
its anti-hero as well: Horacio Oliveira in this case. 
 
The whole book revolves around Oliveira the protagonist, who—at least in the first part—
is an Argentine expat living in Paris with his mistress called La Maga (meaning  
“sorceress” or  “female magician”), whose real name later is introduced as Lucía. As the 
novel is not linear, the first chapter starts with Oliveira’s search for La Maga, who has 
disappeared: “Would I find La Maga?” (Cortázar 2013, 3). From this perspective, it seems 
quite similar to the opening of Aylak Adam, both beginning with a search, more 
specifically, for a woman. While the woman C is looking for in Aylak Adam is unknown 
to him, La Maga appears in most of the chapters due to the lack of linearity in the novel. 
In fact, she is a part of Oliveira’s intellectual group, called the Serpent Club, where they 
meet to drink, listen to music, and have discussions on subjects such as philosophy and 
literature. The first part of the book is set in Paris, following Oliveira and his friends’ 
                                                     
44 “Contra” means “against” or “opposite” in Spanish, implying the genre’s refusal of traditional novel forms. 
 36 
 
bohemian lifestyle mixed with existential angst. His relationship with La Maga 
deteriorates upon the arrival of her son, Rocamadour, who begins to live with them. 
Shortly after Oliveira leaves her, the child dies and La Maga disappears, causing Oliveira 
to search for her. Upon a series of events, the Serpent Clubs disperses, and Oliveira goes 
back to Buenos Aires, where he begins to work at a circus along with his childhood friend, 
Traveler. After some time, the circus is sold and is turned into an asylum. Oliveira 
becomes delusional and begins to confuse Talita, Traveler’s wife, with La Maga. In the 
end, he jumps out of the window at the asylum, but survives. 
 
While the plot might seem simple at the first glance, the novel is full of existential and 
absurd elements, along with surrealist overtones. Apart from taking inspiration from 
authors such as Camus and Sartre, Cortázar was also deeply interested in the Surrealist 
movement. Even when Existentialist authors, including the aforementioned Sartre and 
Camus, denounced Surrealism for they believed existentialist concerns were to be 
considered superior as a more important problem of the human nature, Cortázar refused 
to forgo it completely, and mixed the elements of both Existentialism and Surrealism in 
his works (Langowski 1982, 133). Similar to Aylak Adam, the broody atmosphere of 
existential angst is palpable through Rayuela. Of course, the fact that first part takes place 
during the Paris of 1950s, where the French Existentialism was profoundly in the 
mainstream, is influential. In addition to this, the lifestyle of Oliveira also suggests 
existential nuances. While he would not be called an idler like C, he is more engaged with 
and interested in art as an intellectual, rather than working at a regular job—at least in the 
first part of the novel. Moreover, his sensitivity to and the awareness of the world he lives 
in, and the burden it creates is referred many times, by Oliveira himself and others around 
him alike: “Oliveira is pathologically sensitive to the pressure of what is around, the world 
he lives in, his fate, to speak kindly, in a word, he can’t stand his surroundings. More 
briefly, he has a world-ache.” (Cortázar 2013, 67, my italics). The debate of having a 
“world-ache” syncs with the whole concept of existentialism: life becomes a heavy 
burden as a result of the search for meaning, since in humans, unlike other objects, 
existence precedes essence, leaving them with the quest of finding the purpose of their 
existence. This quest, or search, can be defined as “pressure,” as without a sense of 
meaning life might become a burden for the ones such as Oliveira. According to 
existential philosophy, truth has more of a subjective connotation, and can pass as a 
personal notion (Flynn 2006, 2). Yet, in daily life, as a result of societal norms, for a 
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notion to pass as truth its acceptance by the majority becomes almost obligatory. For most 
people, the meaning of life is to keep oneself busy. The focal point is, however, how it is 
done: Oliveira and his club also keep themselves busy with art, music, and philosophy. 
For others, on the other hand, preoccupation is more or less synonymous with work, 
and/or marriage. Thus, while working is, according to the status quo, an expectation and 
therefore a truth, it is not so for Oliveira et al: “Do you get the sense of the world? To be 
occupied, have an occupation. It sends chills up my spine.’” (Cortázar 2013, 278). Uttered 
by Oliveira himself, the equivalence of “being occupied” with “occupation,” and the fact 
that this has been established as the meaning of life is enough to make him shudder. Thus, 
the question of the collectivity of truth remains arguable.  
 
As the foundation of Existentialism is freedom and free will, the anti-hero’s rejection of 
legality becomes relatable. Whereas rules are necessary to avoid chaos, it inevitably limits 
one’s freedom, and social norms create templates in order to mold individuals in a 
uniform manner, leading to what C calls “death of individuality” in Aylak Adam. Thus, it 
does not come as a surprise that Oliveira as well is not satisfied with the structures and 
forms of life that set physical and metaphysical boundaries: 
 
“‘Underneath it all,’ Ronald said, ‘what bothers you is legality in all its forms. 
As soon as a thing begins to function well, you feel trapped. But all of us a 
little like that, a band of what they call failures because we don’t have 
professions, degrees, and all that. That’s why we are in Paris, man, and your 
famous absurdity is reduced once and for all to a kind of vague, anarchic ideal 
that you’ll never be able to define in concrete terms.’” (Ibid, 165) 
 
It could be interpreted that, in a way, it is the existence of order that adds to Oliveira’s 
world-ache. The well-functioning of the world, and the avoidance of chaos through it 
creates the linearity and legality that turns life into an absurd series of repetitions, 
diminishing the sense of freedom of the individual. Moreover, they also are considered 
to have “failed” life for not living up to the accepted standards of everyday life. 
“Existential anguish is our experience of the possible as the locus of our freedom” (Flynn 
2006, 67). So, the more limitations one’s freedom faces, the heavier their existential angst 
becomes, eventually leading the way for the crisis. In terms of freedom, it could be said 
that Oliveira has the control of his own life and refuses to live by others’ expectations, 
yet it becomes impossible to overcome every limitation he faces; while he is the 
intellectual flaneur in Paris, he turns into the circus worker in Buenos Aires.  
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Moreover, the existential tendencies of Oliveira are also observed through the 
conversations in the Serpent Club, which heavily revolve around the discussion of 
metaphysics. Oliveira’s obsession with the notion of center, and his refusal of it bring 
outs a Heideggerian tone. As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, Oliveira rejects 
the existence of a center, in beings and life alike: “To get the idea that you are the center 
[…] is incalculably stupid. A center as illusory as it would be to try to find ubiquity. There 
is no center, there’s a kind of continuous confluence, an undulation of matter” (Cortázar 
2013, 241). Instead of the existence of a center, Oliveira’s focal point in his claim is that 
to be is to be in a constant state of flux. This confluence, therefore, breaks down the lines 
of beginning and end. Concerning this, Heidegger says: 
 
“But in what manner is a beginning? A beginning is present, insofar as it 
remains in its coming. For the mediation that gathers the four into the center 
of their intimacy is a first coming. Beginning remains as advent. The 
beginning remains all the more, the closer it keeps itself within the possibility 
that it can come, and in its coming brings and sends that which it keeps to 
itself: the infinite relation.” (Heidegger 2000, 195, italics in the original) 
 
While in Heidegger the word “beginning” implies the presence of a center, there still is a 
connotation of the existence of a flux, a confluence, as Heidegger’s beginning is not static; 
there is a constant arrival, such as in a current, creating an “infinite relation” similar to 
that of a confluence. Moreover, even though Oliveira is skeptical about the presence of 
the center, Morelli—the author whose works they read among the club, and whom 
Oliveira encounters later in the novel—accepts its existence yet states it might not always 
be encountered in a way that is expected: “The one who conquers the center wins. From 
that point he dominates all possibilities, and it's senseless for his adversary to insist on 
continuing the play. But the center might be in some side square, or even off the board” 
(Cortázar 2013, 555). Thus, while there might be a center, it is more of an essence than a 
middle point, leaving room still for the continuation of the flux. Morelli’s idea of the 
center as the winning point of the game is also an allusion to the novel itself. While in 
most games, such as chess, the center is determined and apparent, in hopscotch there is 
no known center, it begins and ends, and the game continues through the repetition of it. 
Similarly, there is no exact center in one’s life, it is not the middle of one’s lifespan but 
is rather more associated with the acquisition of meaning and/or a sense of being, if it 
ever takes place at all. (“Existence precedes essence," Morelli said with a smile.” [Ibid, 
556]). The thought of a center is repelling for Oliveira as it creates a sense of unity and 
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order, which he refuses to abide by: “The idea of unity was worrying him because it 
seemed so easy to fall into the worst traps” (Ibid, 79). The traps he mentions could range 
anything from the illusion of comfort provided by habit to a false sense of the world. Yet, 
the certain thing is that apart from being the intellectual, the expat, and the Latin 
American, Oliveira also is the Existential anti-hero of this contranovela, struggling 
through a world of order with an unending world-ache and existential angst, which La 
Maga puts into words for him, as well, in a manner of diagnosis (Moran 2000, 43). “You 
[Oliveira] think you’re in this room, but you’re not. You’re looking at the room, you’re 
not in the room” (Cortázar 2013, 20). This might be interpreted as that Oliveira’s 
obsession with metaphysics comes to the point of alienating him, not only from the 
society, but of life itself, arising a crisis for real. It is just as he states: “The only dangers 
for [him] are metaphysical” (Ibid, 89). 
 
 
3.2. The Tale of Two Cities: Flânerie in Paris vs Buenos Aires 
 
 
I have previously defined a flâneur as a city stroller experiencing the continuous 
impressions of urban life through the act of wandering (Payne and Barbera 2010, 278). 
Although not defined as an idler like C, Oliveira is also considered a flâneur, mainly in 
the first part of the novel through his wandering around Paris. While flânerie is not 
supposed to be interrelated with a search or aim, the novel begins with Oliveira’s search 
for La Maga, however, through the chapter it can be observed that his flânerie dates back 
before the disappearance of her. Thus, compared to C, Oliveira as a flâneur does not base 
his walking solely on the coincidence of coming across a woman. Nonetheless, I have 
mentioned in the second chapter that the woman is only a metaphor for the search for 
meaning, and flânerie can be counted as a manner of rejecting the established order of 
things. There seems to be a similar correlation in Rayuela, as well. Oliveira’s special 
connection with Paris is a reflection of his desire to break down an apparent order through 
search, and a favoring of spontaneous living rather than sticking to plans: “It was about 
that time that I realized that searching was my symbol, the emblem of those who go out 
at night with nothing in mind, the motives of a destroyer of compasses” (Cortázar 2013, 
7). The destruction of compasses, surely, is the breaking of the arranged system of living 
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through plans, timetables, and outlines. For his search to have meaning, therefore, 
Oliveira’s wanderings have to be bereft of time itself, walking for the sake of the act itself, 
rather than expecting an arrival to some place: “[K]eeping track of time was difficult for 
Oliveira, happy ergo futureless” (Ibid, 23). This shows the contradictions he has with 
time and plans; this routine, this customary structure is an initiator of anxiety. When one 
does not have to mull over the anxiety of what is coming, the contentment they would 
receive from life is bound to increase. Although the authenticity of Oliveira’s happiness 
is disputable, by the dismissal of “the compass,” at least the burden of life could seem to 
be alleviated to some point. Walking is thus a form of avoiding habit for people like 
Oliveira “who only want[ ] to escape the ordinary routine of buses and history” (Ibid,  
23).  
 
The Latin American intellectual is a part of Oliveira’s identity, just as it is Cortázar’s. His 
gatherings with the club members revolve around art, and literature, most of the time with 
the readings of Morelli, whom he eventually meets later in the novel. The intellectual, 
however, does not suppress the flaneur’s need to wander, to be outside in order to think, 
similar to what Nietzsche calls the outdoor thinkers: “We do not belong to those who 
have ideas only among books when stimulated by books. It is our habit to think 
outdoors—walking, leaping, climbing, dancing, preferably on lonely mountains or near 
the sea where even the trails become thoughtful (Nietzsche 1974, 366). Hence, it could 
be said that even though Oliveira becomes stimulated by art, literature, and thus books, 
walking still remains as a pivotal act for him in relation to the actualization of his 
ruminations on life, not in the mountains or near the water as Nietzsche suggests, but in 
the city where the “trails” of others become a stimulant.  
 
The city is an undeniable part of the flâneur, and as Certeau has already said, walking is 
an indication of a lack of place (Certeau 1984, 108). Oliveira’s absence of a place, 
however, differs from C’s. C was a flâneur—or man of the crowd—in his native Istanbul, 
yet Oliveira is an expat, a foreigner, an outsider in Paris. For him, Paris is more than a 
city, it is a symbol, and perhaps a metaphor: 
 
“All the time I've known you, all you've done is search, but one gets the 
feeling that what you're looking for is right in your pocket […] [W]hat are 
you after with all that, Horacio?’ 
‘The freedom of the city’ 
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‘Here?’ 
‘It’s a metaphor. And since Paris is another metaphor […] it seems perfectly 
natural to me that I came here for that reason.” (Cortázar 2013, 180) 
 
If indeed Oliveira already has what he seems to have been looking for, it only strengths 
the argument of walking as a metaphor, it is not about the arrival but the journey itself. 
For Oliveira, this metaphor seems to be for freedom; through the act of spontaneous, 
unplanned walking and wandering, one brings down the limitations around their freedom. 
In a way, the lack of a place does not completely carry a negative connotation; to be bereft 
of a place also means one does not have to remain dormant and stable, they are more or 
less free to travel as they please. What about the freedom of the city, then? How can the 
city be freed, and what would Oliveira gain from it? There is, of course, no definite answer 
to either question. My opinion is that Oliveira is looking for the freedom of the city from 
order, which he cannot seem to come to terms with for most of the novel: “One can live 
in disorder without being held by any sense of order” (Ibid, 96). Without the restriction 
of being held back, one can achieve, if not a full, a partial sense of freedom. And as order 
is the creator of rules, and therefore, restrictions, the displacement of it with disorder 
seems to be the solution he suggests. Thus, disorder is a means of freedom for both Paris 
and Oliveira alike. It could be said that the reason he relocates to Paris from Buenos Aires 
might be this, as well: to finally encounter the disorder he could not achieve back home.   
 
On the other hand, Oliveira’s thoughts on arrival might also propose an opposite view: 
“Perhaps everything was not lost and some day, in different circumstances, after other 
proofs, arrival would be possible” (Ibid, 50). I have just mentioned that for the flâneur, 
the emphasis is on the journey, rather than the arrival. Yet here, Oliveira’s voice carries 
a hint of desperation. From different perspectives, this could even be read as a longing 
for home, and a desire to arrive home, to Buenos Aires in Oliveira’s case. “In Paris 
everything was Buenos Aires, and vice versa; in the most eager moments of love he would 
suffer loss and loneliness and relish it” (Ibid, 18). To be able to understand whether 
Oliveira indeed lacks a place, he has to be observed through his search in Buenos Aires, 
as well.  
 
The problem is that for Oliveira, Paris is the city he inhabits as the Latin American 
intellectual, where he gathers with his group of sophisticated friends to have 
conversations about art and music, follow the trails of the city, and become lost among 
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the crowd, as every crowd is a means of studying the city itself (Lehan 1998, 9). Buenos 
Aires, however, is not quite comparable. True, homesickness is apparent in Oliveira the 
Expat’s wandering among Parisian streets, yet when he actually goes back to Buenos 
Aires, flânerie stops being a common practice of his, as he begins to spend most of his 
time with his childhood friend Traveler, and also by working at the circus. While the 
orderly Paris were not able to quench the existential sufferings of Oliveira, his arrival 
upon Buenos Aires makes him realize that it was not as much an arrival as a departure: 
 
“[Oliveira] was coming to the realization that his coming back had really been 
his going away in more than one sense. […] At first Traveler had criticized 
his mania for finding everything wrong with Buenos Aires, for treating the 
city like a tightly girdled whore, but Oliveira explained to him and Talita that 
in his criticism there was so much love that only a pair of mental defectives 
like them would misunderstand his attacks. In the end they realized that he 
was right, that Oliveira could not make any hypocritical compromise with 
Buenos Aires, and that at the moment he was much farther away from his 
own country than when he had been wandering about Europe.” (Ibid, 228) 
 
Thus, it can be said that the emergence of homesickness Oliveira went through in Paris 
was perhaps only a state of mind caused by the way of life as an expat, and the remarkable 
distance between the two cities. Yet, it can at least be inferred that after all, Oliveira does 
indeed lack a place, he neither belongs to Buenos Aires nor Paris; in fact, even as an 
étranger, or outsider, his practices of flânerie ensure him more freedom in Paris compared 
to his native city, in spite of the order the latter refuses to subvert. 
 
 
3.3. (De)Constructing Absurdity in Rayuela 
 
 
The existentialist tendencies of Oliveira, combined with his search of meaning through 
flânerie, bring out the ultimate cause of his angst: absurdity—a social construction, 
caused by another socially constructed idea, habit. I have observed in the second chapter 
the criticism of the status quo for encouraging habit by keeping the individuals at the bay 
through comfort, obliging them to be satisfied with only the tip of the iceberg, deterred 
from asking the important questions, or inquiring about the uniformity of life. Oliveira 
practically shares the same feelings about habit, comfort, and the effortlessness of the 
acquisition of human contentment. “Habit. Everything has a longer overlap than it 
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should” (Cortázar 2013, 172). The repetitive circle of life, generated by habit, afflicts 
Oliveira’s sense of life, rendering it absurd. 
 
The construction of absurdity in the novel is through the opposites in the society, in other 
words, the disparity between the accustomed way of life and that of the protagonist. While 
for the majority, an absurd situation would be defined as something that takes place out 
of the ordinary, for Oliveira, it is the ordinariness itself that is in fact absurd. He explains 
it by giving the example of receiving your bottle of milk at your door every day, a part of 
the routine for many:  
 
“The absurdity is that it doesn’t look like an absurdity. Absurdity is that you 
go out in the morning and find a bottle of milk on the doorstep and you are at 
peace because the same thing happened to you yesterday and will happen 
again tomorrow. It’s this stagnation, this so be it, this suspicious lack of 
exceptions. I don’t know, you see, we ought to try some other road.” (Ibid, 
165)  
 
By adapting ourselves to the repetitive cycle of daily situations, we find and live by the 
comfort resulting from knowing what is coming next. For the ones like Oliveira, it is 
meaningless to rely on something like the routine, which apparently slowly takes away 
the element of surprise in everyday life, turning each day into the other, and taking the 
pleasure out of it. However, Oliveira’s problem is that he is aware of this situation, as he 
keeps his critical distance and remains outside of it—just as La Maga claimed he is not 
in the room, but rather looking at it. A regular individual, on the other hand, one that is 
used to live by the constructions of habit would consider the lack of it as absurd, as 
without the sense of order would come disorder, or chaos, or at least this would be what 
most individuals would think. This also is another matter of absurdity, the stigma that 
there could either be complete order or complete disorder. By looking for another way of 
life, one does not have to forgo everything they have become accustomed to in daily life. 
The point is to space out the walls of habit, rather than breaking it down completely. “And 
these crises that most people think of as terrible, as absurd, I personally think they serve 
to show us the real absurdity, the absurdity of an ordered and calm world, with a room 
where different people are drinking coffee at two o’clock in the morning, without any of 
this having the slightest meaning unless it’s hedonistic” (Ibid, 164). In a society where a 
universal occurrence such as existential suffering is tried to be repressed by being 
considered as “absurd” and “terrible” suggests the existence of such a constrained world 
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that it leaves no room for one to even reflect on their place, on the basis that it could 
disrupt the “perfect” order of the community. For Oliveira, then, this obsession with order 
is the primary structure within the construction of absurdity.  
 
When the narrative of the novel is considered, the thin line between the construction and 
deconstruction of absurdity comes into the surface. As mentioned, Oliveira’s rejection of 
repetition within the quotidian boundaries is his means of challenging the order, or the 
societal system that is based on habit, the foundation of what he considers as absurd. In 
the first part of the book, Oliveira’s distinct way of life—through the prioritizing of his 
intellectual endeavors over working at a job, using flânerie as a symbol and/or metaphor 
for the search of meaning in life, and refusal of the typical family model—which ends his 
relationship with La Maga after her son comes to live with them—all can be counted as 
a step forward to disrupt what he acknowledges as absurd and banal. The question is, does 
this eventually enable him to overcome the absurdity of life? The answer would be no, as 
no matter what he does he cannot fully isolate himself from the society, and thus is forced 
to come face to face with his idea of the absurd.  
 
To deconstruct the absurd, it is significant to remember that, first of all, what is absurd is 
considered as so according to the accumulation of the character’s own personal 
experience and state of mind, binding it to subjectivity. As mentioned, what he considers 
as absurd could be, and most of the time is, completely different from the understanding 
of absurdity by a regular individual. Moreover, his own opinions and narrative are 
layered. As Derrida says, narrative in itself doubles through the same narrator: “There is 
the double narrative, the narrative of the vision enclosed in the general narrative carried 
on by the same narrator. The line that separates the enclosed narrative from the other—
marks the upper edge of a space that will never be closed” (Derrida 1979, 85-86). This 
might mean that there is more than one side to Oliveira’s notions on absurdity. Above or 
under his words imprinted in the book could lie a different interpretation of the narrative 
through the unclosed “space” in it. To put it another way, Oliveira might denounce others’ 
as banal and limited for not—even—trying to escape the boundaries of their comfort 
zone, name the whole process as absurd and exclude himself from it to some point. Yet, 
he is also aware of the fact that his efforts remain futile as one person cannot break down 
an established order by themselves, especially by rejecting it. There emerges another 
sense of absurdity. If it is apparent that there is practically no way to escape life’s vicious 
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cycle, to make oneself suffer through isolation suggests also an absurd undertone. It 
makes almost no difference to Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus; no matter how hard 
Sisyphus might push up the boulder; there is no way he can break down what is 
established. The futility of either one’s actions are still open to debate, but the fact that in 
the end little changes is more or less settled. Upon this, the meaning and definition of 
absurdity deconstructs itself, and Oliveira is caught in the loop through his own rejection 
of what he calls absurd.  
 
Through Oliveira’s approach against absurdity, the reattribution of meaning to it becomes 
clearer. His inescapable rejection of the absurdity within daily life turns his own action 
into an absurd one, thus creating a loop and failing his actual goal of ridding himself of 
it. It is why he claims that the unique way of escaping the loop of absurdity is to live 
according to it. “Only by living absurdly is it possible to break out of this infinite 
absurdity” (Cortázar 2013, 101).  
 
Then, could it be said that as his actions or way of living sync with the others—albeit 
through different intentions—he begins to “fit” into the society, upon the sharing of a 
similar pattern of living? It is questionable, first of all because the constitution of a 
community upon the sharing of similar ideals turns the definition of the ideal itself into 
an ambiguous one (Irzık 2017, 80). Is the ideal the usual way of life that revolves around 
routine and habit, or is it the sense of order whose disruption that many are afraid of? In 
a way, it is almost impossible to attain unanimity on this, which also deconstructs the 
stereotypes of the ideal society. Oliveira’s decision of living absurdly is not to attain this 
claimed ideal in the society, but to escape the meaningless of it. Secondly, it is also 
ambiguous what exactly he means by “living absurdly,” as the meaning is subjective. 
According to his definition of the absurd, it would mean to live like everybody else, 
through the repetitive cycle of everyday life. From the perspective of others’, it would 
signify a way of living that is out of the “ordinary,” some nonsensical, and even perhaps, 
ridiculous existence. Which one Oliveira refers to, we do not know, perhaps neither does 
he, although he explains it as a “different way” of living—which barely makes a 
difference as the meaning every person would attain to difference would vary: 
“Underneath it all we could be what we are on the surface […] but we would have to live 
in a different way. And what does it mean to live in a different way? Maybe to live 
absurdly in order to do away with the absurd” (Ibid, 99). Here again, the absurd way of 
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living is open to interpretation, and thus is constantly deconstructed and reconstructed. 
My personal opinion is that Oliveira refers to living according to habit—the thing he 
despises thoroughly—so as to at least rid himself of the absurdity. Still, the point of 
deconstruction is to eliminate the imposition of one single interpretation, therefore, 
Oliveira’s absurd way of living could also be interpreted in another manner. However, 
when taken into consideration his life upon his return the Buenos Aires, the most striking 
change he goes through is, I believe, employment. He begins to work at a circus with his 
childhood friend Traveler, and while it cannot be fully said that it is what others would 
call as an “ideal” or at least a preferable job, there is a striking shift from the bohemian 
lifestyle of the intellectual flâneur in Paris to this. Thus, the underlying meaning behind 
his absurd way of living could indeed be living according to the status quo.  
 
Similarly, Henry Lefebvre’s analysis of the intellectuals’ degradation of everyday life 
reminds one of the multiple layers of absurdity, and how the meaning changes according 
to the subject: “Intellectuals, ‘cultivated’ men, are convinced in advance (why?) that 
everyday life has only triviality to offer. In fact, this belief plays an important role in so-
called ‘existential’ philosophy, which condemns all non-metaphysical life to triviality and 
inauthenticity” (Lefebvre 1991, 239). Lefebvre denounces both the ideals of 
existentialism and that of intellectuals, claiming that they look down on everyday life 
with the imposition that it is nothing but tedious, offering little to none for the 
“cultivation” of beings. From his perspective, then, everyday life would not be—at least 
as much as Oliveira considers it—so absurd, breaking down the established norms of 
absurdity again.  
 
Oliveira does bring forward the claim of living absurdly to escape from it, yet the question 
remains whether it works or not. When looked into his attempt at it, mainly through his 
acquisition of a job, the circus does not last and is turned into an asylum in the end, where, 
this time, Oliveira and his friends begin to work. The conversion of his workplace to an 
asylum can be interpreted as an early warning of his approaching madness. In fact, as the 
time passes Oliveira’s mental stability begins to deteriorate, to the point that he becomes 
delusional and thinks Talita, Traveler’s wife, is actually La Maga, whom he has not seen 
since her disappearance in Paris: “I know she’s Talita, but a while ago she was La Maga. 
She’s two people, just like us.” “’They call that being crazy,’ Traveler said.” (Ibid, 346). 
It is open to interpretation, and it can be said that Oliveira’s considering Traveler as his 
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doppelganger might not sound completely mad, yet the fact that Oliveira’s adopting an 
absurd lifestyle is followed by an upcoming madness is hard to miss. It might signify the 
impossibility of escaping from absurdity, even when one enters it. Plus, the attempted 
suicide of Oliveira also implies the unattainability of a total liberation, as well as bringing 
it down to the two choices of madness and suicide, just as it was in Aylak Adam. On the 
other hand, it is a suicide attempt, therefore is barely a solution, and the effectiveness of 
madness in the face of absurdity is also dubious as they seem to have more of a cause and 
effect relationship. Is salvation completely impossible, then? Probably, yes. Yet, while 
the achievement of full liberation from the absurdity of daily life might be unattainable, 
it could be intercepted to some point.  One way to do it could be given by means of art, 
and especially literature: “Reading is, then, always a process in which there are pauses 
during which ‘everyday life’ intervenes” (Franco 1980, 109). My claim is that if the act 
of reading is intervened by everyday life, it could also be vice versa: reading could 
intervene and create pauses from the daily life, as well. Considering the Serpent Club’s 
relationship with literature, especially through the readings of Morelli, this can pass as a 
valid claim. And upon this comes the realization that perhaps they were able to intervene 
the absurdity of life at some point, and the complete riddance of absurdity was not an 
absolute necessity: “[T]hey had already let Sunday afternoon and evening slip by reading, 
listening to records, getting up alternately to warm up some coffee or prepare some mate” 
(Cortázar 2013, 16). 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
“The Canon, a word religious in its origin, has become a choice among texts struggling 
with one another for survival, whether you interpret the choice as being made by 
dominant social groups, institutions of educations, [or] traditions of criticism […]” 
(Bloom 1995, 20). This quotation by Harold Bloom was one of the starting points of this 
thesis. Growing up reading both canonical and non-canonical works, the designation of 
what is canon has always been a point of interest and intrigue for me. Thus, I aimed to 
combine two works from two parts of the world which would be considered as the 
periphery of “canon,” Turkey and Latin America. While reading Rayuela for the first 
time, I found the similarities it carried to Aylak Adam quite astonishing, as the two authors 
probably had never heard of each other during their lifetimes even though they were 
contemporaries. This, of course, would not be the issue if their works were considered as 
canon. While Cortázar is internationally much more famous and well-known compared 
to Atılgan, and his work is included through the syllabi around the world, his canonicity 
is still open to debate compared to Western authors such as Joyce, Woolf, or Faulkner. 
This naturally brings forward the debate of geography, and how Eurocentrism determines 
what passes as canon. By bringing forward a comparison of a Turkish and an Argentine 
text, I, first of all, aimed to analyze how mainstream theories—Existentialism in this 
context—travels to the periphery and is implemented and understood there. As the 
ambiance of both novels is heavily existentialist, a factor caused by the era they were 
written in, when especially French Existentialism was at its peak, I analyzed the apparent 
existential angst of the characters, especially C’s, through the terms and notions of some 
of the leading existentialist philosophers, mainly Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus. For 
Oliveira, I focused more on his intellectual identity, correlating it with Cortázar’s own, 
and how it is reflected as his apparent existential angst in the novel. I examined flânerie 
as an extension of this Existentialism in both characters, as a means of search for meaning, 
but also of the rejection of the ordinary, the habitual. In terms of how everyday life is 
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interpreted as absurd by both C and Oliveira, I utilized, again, Camus’ thoughts on 
absurdity related to repetition and applied it into the routine of daily life. Especially in 
the third chapter where I examined Rayuela, I tried to deconstruct the understanding of 
“absurdity” and the absurd, and how there are more than one side to it.  
 
While this thesis mainly focuses on the similarities between the two novels, one 
significant, and challenging, difference remains: the structure. As mentioned before, in 
Rayuela, Cortázar brings forward a revolutionary structure. It is not only the non-linearity 
that makes Rayuela innovative, as that was preceded by a few others, but the “choice” it 
offers to the reader. The table of instructions at the beginning of the novel is a unique one, 
it draws a structure for the reader but leaves it open for them to choose which path to 
follow, as well, by disregarding the table. Thus, this whole structure of the novel, in a 
way, is related to Existentialism itself. The free will of the reader is apparent, they can 
either follow it or choose an already-drawn one for themselves, which parallels to the 
standpoint of the characters in both novels. While C and Oliveira disregard the “table of 
instructions” of the status quo on life, the others seem to find comfort in following it, as 
it is simpler and easier. This situation also relates to Søren Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, a 
major work of Existential philosophy, in which he focuses on the question of marriage 
through a character, such as C and Oliveira, that rejects it. The title of the book is also 
significant, as through the table of instructions the reader is given their own “either/or.” 
They can either follow Cortázar, or their own free will. Cortázar’s novel, therefore, 
differentiates itself from others, and from Aylak Adam, as well, by its offer of free will to 
the reader. 
 
This thesis was also meant to be a means of demonstrating how Existentialism as an 
abstract notion is formed and shaped within the novels. While both Atılgan and Cortázar 
were affiliated with Existentialism as a movement and an idea, the reflection of it within 
the novels cannot be said to be completely affirmative. That is to say, both C and Oliveira 
do suffer from an existential angst and are in favor of free will to shape their own path, 
yet the application of this in the novels appears to be limited. The distinctness of both 
characters, as well as the discrepancy between their ideals and that of the societies they 
live in tend to alienate them, to the point of complete solitude at some level. The fact that 
they both reach to the verge of madness and suicide makes one question whether there is 
also a hint of criticism of Existentialism, as well. They are meant to be the anti, ayrıkı, 
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contra heroes, yet at some point their belief in free will is shaken, as well, as it can be 
seen when Oliveira partially forgoes his lifestyle as an intellectual flâneur upon his return 
to Buenos Aires, and when C begins a relationship with Ayşe again, even though he 
knows she is not the woman he had been looking for. The end of the both novels seems 
to reflect this shaken belief in the concrete results of abstract notions of Existentialism. 
While free will is what grants freedom and originality to each individual, it does make 
the reader question whether it is always for the better.  
 
My ultimate goal was to demonstrate that even though Atılgan and Cortázar went through 
quite different experiences in life, the universality of literature and philosophy was 
reflected through the similarities in their works. It cannot be said that Aylak Adam and 
Rayuela were inspired by one another, as the authors were oblivious to each other, yet 
both were inspired by the canons of literature and philosophy, and thus brought forward 
one Turkish and one Argentine protagonist who appear not too different from each other, 
after all. Although the novels differ from one another from length to structure, the 
sufferings of the characters relate to one another’s, as well as a coinciding pattern in their 
stories, both following search for meaning through flânerie, refusal of habit and absurdity, 
experimenting with the absurd way of living, madness, and a suicide attempt. Oliveira 
says in Rayuela that he sees Traveler as his doppelganger, yet in my honest opinion C 
suits that role better.  
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